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Abstract 
This paper examines the role of banks in the financial restructurings of Norwegian offshore 
companies following the steep fall in oil prices starting in June 2014. Developing the work of 
Torstensen and Rasmussen (2017), we delve into the resolution of financial distress in 11 OSV 
companies from 2015 to 2018, aiming to understand the role of banks as main creditors in 
financial restructurings. Further, based on insight from key stakeholders, we discuss the 
outlook for bank behaviour in future restructurings. Analysing the restructuring outcomes, we 
show how bank debt is practically unchanged from the level prior to the restructurings. Instead 
of nominal reductions, the banks have opted to amend and extend current loan terms. Although 
partially compensated through debt converted to equity and cash redemptions, bondholders 
have seen their claims being greatly reduced. Moreover, in most cases, equity infusions came 
in form of private placements from the largest existing owners, significantly diluting other 
shareholders. As such, banks have favoured large existing shareholders at the expense of other 
unsecured claimholders, violating the assumption of absolute priority. As we believe the 
current decline in the OSV industry is just as much a structural crisis as it is a cyclical 
downturn, we argue that it is essential that banks opt for scrapping of vessels and enhanced 
industry consolidation when resolving financial distress in the future. Nevertheless, recent 
restructurings provide indications of banks being neither prepared nor willing to address the 
fundamental issue of overcapacity in the market.  
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1. Introduction 
All good things must come to an end 
By the summer of 2014, the price of one barrel of Brent Crude oil was $110. After the heavy 
drop in prices following the financial crisis of 2008, oil prices had rapidly recovered and 
remained in the range of $80-120 between 2010 and 2014. Encouraged by high prices, oil 
companies invested heavily in exploration and production (E&P) activity. Consequently, 
industries associated with the E&P companies took advantage of the situation, experiencing a 
massive uplift in revenues.  
Simultaneously, ship owners along the west coast of Norway had acquired offshore support 
vessels (OSV)1 on a large scale to meet what seemed like an ever-increasing demand for oil-
service products. Despite increasing costs and emerging overcapacity, there were few signs of 
companies fearing a downturn, substantiated by an increasingly financially geared fleet of 
vessels. Banks, bondholders and investors all jumped on the bandwagon.  
During the summer of 2014, a new source of oil, the US shale oil, entered the market. This 
happened at the same time as global demand for oil fell due to western countries looking to 
shift away from fossil fuels and the growth rate in emerging markets slowed down. In the 
months that followed, the flood of new oil supply caused a collapse in the price of crude 
(Stacey, 2016). Despite recovering somewhat during the spring of 2015, the crude price 
bottomed out at around $30 per barrel in January 2016. 
As the oil price dropped, the E&P companies were desperate to protect their own bottom line. 
This essentially meant paying their suppliers less, causing a formidable decline in day rates 
for the oil-service industries. Consequently, firms found themselves defaulting on the debt 
accumulated during the heyday a few years earlier. Since the oil price collapse, a string of 
financial restructurings has weighed heavily on the OSV companies. Today, the industry 
continues to struggle under a mountain of debt and a significantly oversupplied market.  
                                                 
1 In this thesis, we define OSVs as oil-service vessels such as supply ships, AHTSs, subsea and seismic vessels. 
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From companies accumulating vessels at a record-speed going into the 2010s, OSVs are now 
to be found laid up all the way along the west coast of Norway. Exhibit 1.1 shows the 
development in the number of cold-stacked OSVs operating in the North Sea, and the average 
monthly Brent Crude oil price from 2013 to present. Evidently, the growth in the number of 
laid-up ships from the summer of 2014 to the winter of 2017 was formidable. During the last 
18 months, the demand side has picked up somewhat. However, the number of vessels still 
rusting away along the coast is significant, illustrative of ship owners’ continuing depressed 
situation today. 
Exhibit 1.1 – Number of cold-stacked North Sea OSVs (black) and Brent crude price development (red)  
Source: Hagland Offshore and U.S. Energy Information Administration 
In this paper, we focus on the wave of financial restructurings in the Norwegian offshore 
industry following the oil-price collapse starting mid-2014. Through a thorough review of 
restructurings in the offshore industry, we aim to understand the outcomes of the restructuring 
processes that have already occurred. Further, we focus on what is yet to come, as a majority 
of the companies in the OSV segments are still suffering under substantial indebtedness, 
unprofitable margins and a fundamentally skewed market balance.  
Particularly, our emphasis is on the behaviour of banks in these processes. As the principal 
provider of financing to the offshore industry during the upswing, these banks became equally 
exposed to losses when the market turned sour. Today, banks are considered as holding the 
key not only to the survival of the financially distressed companies, but also to finding a 
financially sustainable future for the whole OSV industry.  
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Litterature review 
Academic research on financial restructuring has been concentrated in four areas: bankruptcy 
resolutions, bankruptcy cost, governance changes in bankruptcy and the effects of bankruptcy 
on stock prices. Our thesis, however, seeks to examine the outcomes of financial 
restructurings, and in particular the role of banks in these processes – their considerations and 
contributions. This section provides an insight into relevant research literature on financial 
reorganisations of companies and the role of banks as key claimholders in these 
restructurings.2 
Why restructure and not liquidate? 
The inevitable question every board faces when deciding the fate of a financially distressed 
company is whether the company should be restructured or file for bankruptcy. One of the 
most important determinants in this regard relates to the bankruptcy costs. Out-of-court 
restructurings3 are often expected to be less costly than filing for bankruptcy (Giammarino, 
1989), hence, the greater the cost savings, the greater the incentives for claimholders to settle 
through a restructuring process. 
Gilson, John and Lang (1990) examine the determinants of the choice of restructuring 
privately versus bankruptcy proceedings. Of their distressed firms, 80 restructured their debt 
out of court, while the remaining 89 had to file for bankruptcy. The study finds that the 
probability for successful restructurings is higher when there are fewer distinct classes of debt 
outstanding and a greater proportion of the debt is issued by banks. Moreover, the higher the 
proportion of intangible assets in a firm, the greater the likelihood for succeeding in a private 
workout due to the value of such assets likely being eroded through asset sales and limited 
customer demand (Hotchkiss, John, Mooradian, & Thorburn, 2008). 
Franks and Torous (1994) document, consistent with Giammarino (1989), that there is greater 
firm value to share in restructurings than in bankruptcy. They also find that senior creditors 
                                                 
2 The purpose of this section is not to provide a comprehensive review of all literature, but rather to highlight certain areas of 
research relevant to our analysis. 
3 Throughout the thesis, we will use the terms out-of-court restructurings, private workouts and workouts interchangeably. 
All terms, however, refer to the situation when a company negotiates the terms of outstanding debt with its claimholders 
outside the courtroom, and/or not as part of any bankruptcy proceedings. 
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are more willing to forego a greater share of the value in restructurings than in bankruptcy 
proceedings, violating the absolute priority rule. Further, they document how creditors, in all 
classes, to a larger extent convert their debt to equity in restructurings (9% of firm value), 
while the magnitude of these deviations is much smaller in bankruptcy negotiations (2% of 
firm value).  
Asset liquidity and whether fire sales exist 
As our thesis examines financially distressed companies in asset-heavy industries, it is 
particularly interesting to examine the importance of asset liquidity in restructurings. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1992) focus their paper on the economy and industry-wide determinants of asset 
liquidity and, as such, how asset liquidity is a key contributing factor to the cost of financial 
distress. They argue that distressed firms are likely to sell off assets at a time when the best 
potential buyers, most likely firms in the same industry, are financially distressed as well, 
contributing to even more depressed prices.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) emphasise that the issue of illiquidity is particularly relevant in 
cyclical industries, as industry buyers of cyclical assets are constrained because they are hit 
by the same macroeconomic shocks. These conclusions are in line with later research done by 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), suggesting that due to the volatility in cyclical industries, 
claiming assets in the event of default typically requires creditors to take haircuts on 
outstanding debt. 
Further, Pulvino (1998) addresses several of the abovementioned issues. He finds that not only 
do financially distressed sellers receive discounted prices on their assets due to the depressed 
state of the industry, the bankruptcy status of the seller appears to further influence the 
outcome, lowering the prices as buyers exploit the desperate nature of the seller.  
The anatomy of financial distressed companies 
Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) find in their paper that sales of major assets are vital 
means in order to avoid bankruptcy. Only three out of 21 companies that sell above 20% of 
their assets subsequently file for bankruptcy, compared to 49% of firms selling no or fractional 
parts of their asset base. Further, asset-selling companies are more likely to complete a 
successful debt exchange (62% vs. 28%). The proceeds from asset sales are most commonly 
used to pay off senior private debt. 
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Leverage at the industry level is negatively correlated with asset sales (Asquith et al., 1994). 
As our data sample primarily consists of firms operating in asset-heavy and highly leveraged 
industries, this should imply that few of the firms are expected to sell off assets. Moreover, 
asset prices are likely to be realised at a discount due to depressed market conditions. This is 
due to a limited number of potential buyers, consistent with the research by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992).  
Asquith et al. (1994) document that bank lenders respond to financial distress in various ways, 
including requiring accelerated payments and reducing further lending. They also find that 
banks are commonly observed to waive current financial covenants such as extending maturity 
on the debt and/or delaying interest payments, rather than take a haircut on outstanding 
principal.  
When do banks take equity in debt restructurings? 
James (1995) adds to the results of Asquith et al. (1994) and shows how banks make 
concessions on outstanding debt only conditional upon junior debtholders accepting to 
restructure their claims. In general, banks are more willing to forgive principal and convert 
debt to equity when a smaller fraction of the debt is held by public creditors. These two studies 
suggest that the key to avoiding bankruptcy is the ability to restructure public claims, not 
private debt.  
In his follow-up paper, James (1996) demonstrates the importance of bank participation in 
out-of-court restructurings, as it facilitates public debt exchange offers. Compared to 
restructurings where banks take no action, the study finds that exchange offers which include 
banks reducing principal have a significantly higher likelihood in succeeding, as well as they 
involve greater reductions of outstanding public debt and less senior debt offered to the 
bondholders (Hotchkiss et al., 2008).  
Validation of the absolute priority rule in restructurings  
The absolute priority rule (APR) states that no creditor or shareholder can receive anything of 
value under a restructuring plan unless all senior claimholders have been made whole (Gilson 
et al., 1990). A vast number of studies have documented patterns of how financial distress is 
resolved, and how violations of the APR are frequently occurring in order to successfully reach 
agreement with all claimholders. There are several studies exhibiting strong deviations from 
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the APR, particularly pointing to the tendency of shareholders ending up with more than they 
hold legitimate claim to.  
The priority of claims is violated for three-quarters of the Chapter 11 cases in Franks and 
Torous (1989). Moreover, Longhofer (1997) states that violations of APR are commonplace 
also in out-of-court workouts. Similarly, Torstensen and Rasmussen (2017) consistently find 
deviations from absolute priority in Norwegian financial restructurings following the oil price 
collapse in 2014.  
Research topic – why, what and how? 
In this section, we briefly explain the motivation behind our choice of topic and the objectives 
of this thesis. Further, we introduce our methodical approach and the structure of our thesis. 
Evident from our literature review, considerable research has been done on the topic of 
financially distressed companies. However, we have not found many papers written on the 
topic of Norwegian financial restructurings, nor have we discovered literature particularly 
emphasising the role of banks in such processes. In passing, we came across a thesis written 
by Jørgen Torstensen and Magnus Rasmussen in 2017, dealing with financial restructurings. 
Their thesis, although somewhat more focused on shareholder value and equity strategies, 
sparked an interest in the topic of financial restructurings and the factors determining banks’ 
behaviour in these negotiation processes. 
There has been extensive media coverage of financial restructurings in the Norwegian offshore 
industry in the last few years. Interestingly, the recent wave of Norwegian restructurings 
distinguishes itself in that of being the first Norwegian restructuring wave where the distressed 
companies are significantly financed with capital from the Norwegian high-yield bond market. 
As a result, we have noted that the media coverage has included several stories sharing 
bondholders’ vocal frustration over unfair treatment from, amongst others, banks. Hence, a 
thesis aiming to understand the outcomes, and the relationships between banks and other 
stakeholders, in these restructuring processes would make for a timely and relevant choice of 
topic.  
We will examine the role of banks in financial restructurings of offshore companies following 
the steep fall in oil prices starting in June 2014. By analysing the outcomes of 18 financial 
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restructurings, our purpose is to understand the contributions and considerations of banks in 
particular in these processes. As it seems likely that new rounds of restructurings will occur in 
the near future, we also put a particular emphasis on the role of banks in contributing to solving 
the fundamental issue of overcapacity troubling the OSV industry. 
Our thesis builds on public information released in conjunction with financial restructuring 
processes, as, for instance, engagement of financial advisors, summons to bondholders’ 
meeting, notice of extraordinary general meeting or restructuring solution announcements. In 
addition, we have gone through our sample firms’ financial statements and annual reports, as 
well as having read news articles covering each case. Moreover, qualitative insight into the 
topic of restructurings has been developed through interviews with stakeholders and regulators 
involved in such processes, as well as our own reflections. 
Initially, we introduce a theoretical foundation on the topics of capital structure, seniority of 
claims and the concept of financial restructurings, upon which we will build our thesis. Next, 
we present our data sample. Thereafter, we discuss the role of banks in financial restructurings 
and elaborate on the determinants of bank behaviour in these processes. Subsequently, we 
analyse how these considerations have translated into contributions in our sample 
restructurings, but also place an emphasis on what has not been done and what is yet to come. 
Finally, we discuss the limitations of our thesis and provide a conclusion.   
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2. Theory 
In this chapter, we will introduce the theoretical backdrops we consider most relevant for this 
thesis. Firstly, we present theory on capital structure and seniority of claims. Here, we also 
address the impact of a company’s debt being private or publicly disbursed. We then embark 
on the challenge of understanding the complexity of financial restructurings. Lastly, we 
provide an overview of a typical financial restructuring.  
A company’s capital structure  
A company must choose the way in which it finances its operations and growth investments, 
using private or public debt, equity or through issuance of other securities. The relative 
proportions of debt and equity that a company has outstanding, constitute the company’s 
capital structure. In general, the sources of funds are senior debt, subordinated debt and equity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2.1 – Capital structure and seniority of claims 
Exhibit 2.1 illustrates the distinction between secured and unsecured debt. The primary 
difference is the presence of collateral, an asset taken as security in the case of non-payment. 
Secured creditors have the right to seize this collateral in the event of a default. If the value of 
the collateral is insufficient to cover the entire claim, a secured claimant has seniority over an 
unsecured, regardless of both claimholders being senior. Hence, as lower seniority means 
higher risk, such claims require higher returns, yielding higher cost of capital. 
 
Equity
Subordinated debt
Senior debt
Unsecured
Secured
Sources of funds Seniority Risk Cost of Capital
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Senior debt 
Senior debt has the highest priority, and can be both secured and unsecured, with the secured 
debt carrying less risk and thus lower interest rates. Senior debt generally comes as bank loans 
or bonds. Excluding convertible debt, creditors only hold claim on the face value of the loan, 
plus interest. As such, the return on the debt is capped by the contractually agreed terms, and 
consequently the upside potential is limited. In our sample, almost all interest-bearing debt is 
senior. 
Subordinated debt 
Subordinated debt, often referred to as junior debt, is any debt that falls behind senior debt. 
Given its lower priority during payback, subordinated debt carries greater risks and hence 
higher interest rates. Subordinated debt is typically shareholder loans, loans from associated 
companies, or bonds. All these abovementioned sorts of subordinated debt can be found in our 
sample. 
Equity 
Shareholders are lowest on the priority ladder, only having rights to the company’s cash flow 
after all creditors have received compensation for their respective claims. As such, 
shareholders carry the greatest risk in the event of non-payment, and consequently also require 
the highest return. However, for a shareholder, claims can be considered as the residual once 
all creditors are paid, hence providing an unlimited upside gain during good times for a 
company. As with debt, there are many subcategories of equity, including preferred and 
common stock. 
Seniority of claims and the absolute priority rule 
The seniority of these sources of funds represents the order in which claimholders are entitled 
to the cash flow generated by a company. Claim seniority becomes especially applicable for a 
company’s stakeholders during times of financial distress and is linked to the absolute priority 
rule. The APR denies any claimholder a stake in the securities of a reorganised firm, until 
more senior claims have been fully compensated (Franks & Torous, 1989). Hence, 
claimholders holding senior debt will be entitled to payment in full before holders of claims 
with lower seniority can be compensated.  
 14
In the event of bankruptcy and liquidation, APR implies that each claimholder’s distribution 
depends on the seniority of their claim and the total amount of proceeds received from the 
liquidation of the company’s assets (Hotchkiss et al., 2008).   
Eberhart and Weiss (1998) argue that the APR is explicitly or implicitly assumed in many 
seminal finance models. For instance, Black and Scholes (1973) show how equity can be 
considered a call option on the underlying value of the firm. The face value of the debt can be 
viewed as the stock’s exercise price and the debt’s maturity as the option’s time to maturity.4 
Using this analogy, if the firm value is below the face value of the debt at maturity, the stock 
– or firm, rather – is out of the money, and bankruptcy occurs. The APR is thus followed as 
shareholders receive nothing when the bondholders have not been paid in full. 
Jones (2010) argues that the absolute priority rule is more honoured in breach than in 
observance. This is consistent with empirical findings, as discussed in our literature review. A 
usual explanation for APR violation is found in cases where parties in the liquidation 
negotiations want a speedy process. Thus, any compensation violating APR can be seen as 
payment of a claimholder’s option to stall or complicate a restructuring. In addition, violations 
in terms of favourable outcomes for equity holders are often driven by the quest to increase 
value-creation for the post-restructured company. For instance, experienced owners could be 
able to derive more value from assets than other claimholders would through liquidation. Key 
historic violations of APR relevant for this thesis include the shipping crisis of the 1970s and 
the financial crisis of 2008. 
Financial restructurings 
A firm is in financial distress at a given point in time when the liquid assets of the firm are not 
sufficient to meet the current requirements of its hard contracts (Hotchkiss et al., 2008), or 
when covenants5 are breached. There are a number of mechanisms available for firms in terms 
of rectifying the mismatch of liquidity and obligations. Exhibit 2.2 provides an overview of 
the different routes the firm may take to resolve financial distress.  
                                                 
4 Assuming the debt to be zero-coupon. 
5 Contractually agreed conditions that require the borrower to meet certain requirements, i.e. maximum debt-equity ratio. 
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One option is selling off company assets in order to increase liquidity. However, unless the 
distressed company struggles for some idiosyncratic reason, such as mismanagement, the 
depressed market implies that potential buyers within the same industry are likely to have cash 
flow problems of their own, putting downwards pressure on the asset prices limiting gain from 
the sale.  
   
Exhibit 2.2 - Options for a financially distressed firm defaulting on its debt 
If an asset sale does not provide sufficient headroom to rectify the mismatch between liquidity 
and debt obligations, or if selling off assets negatively impacts the operational strategy of the 
company, the company can seek to renegotiate the terms of its outstanding debt with the 
claimholders. This can be done out of court or through negotiations in court.  
As this thesis develops the work of Torstensen and Rasmussen (2017), we will use a similar 
definition of financial restructuring to that used in their thesis. A financial restructuring occurs 
if the reorganisation of the company’s capital structure includes one or more of the following 
elements: 
1. A minimum of 40% dilution of existing shares through issuance of new equity 
2. Reduction in outstanding nominal debt, or liabilities, without full repayment, either 
through cash payment below par, conversion of debt to equity or pure write-offs  
Company defaulting 
on its debt 
Sale of assets
Out-of-court 
restructuring
In-court 
restructuring
Bankruptcy
Agreement with 
claimholders
Liquidation
Financial restructuring
Change in capital structurepay
• New equity issues
• Conversion of debt to equity
• Cancellation of debt
• Buyback of debt 
Change in payment structure
• Extension of maturities 
• Postponement of amortisation
• Change in interest payments
• Changes in covenants 
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3. A minimum of 25% dilution of existing shares, and significant amortisation reductions 
and/or extended maturities on existing debt.  
Most companies initially seek to reach an agreement with their creditors through negotiations 
out of court. If such an agreement is not feasible outside the courtroom, the company may file 
for protection under bankruptcy laws, and solve the issues through formal court proceedings. 
As Skudal and Vartdal (2017) explain, the Norwegian bankruptcy law lacks several tools that 
are commonly observed in out-of-court restructurings and imposes strict demands.6 Thus, in-
court debt settlement proceedings are an unattractive solution for many companies. All 
restructurings in our data sample are private workouts, which is by far the most common 
option in Norway.  
When going through negotiations with its creditors, inside or outside the courtroom, a 
company seeks relief from burdening debt obligations endangering the company’s ability to 
further exist as a going concern. In our thesis, we distinguish between two ways of 
renegotiating the terms of outstanding debt – a company can refinance and/or restructure. The 
former relates to a change in the payment structure of the debt and a restructuring refers to a 
change in the capital structure of the company, where the severity of which is arguably greater 
in the latter negotiation process. A refinancing of the company would typically include 
extensions of maturity, postponements of amortisation, temporarily reduced interest and/or 
amended covenants, measures which would effectively ease the company’s short-term 
liquidity obligations. In more distressed cases, such as those included under our definition of 
financial restructurings, changes in the capital structure are necessary. Issuance of new equity, 
conversion of debt to equity, or cancellation of debt are examples of such changes. It is 
important to note that significant restructurings, including all of the cases in our sample, also 
include changes in payment structure. Hence, refinancing and restructurings often coincide. 
It may be that the company is impossible to save. If no solution is found amongst claimholders 
having the power to enforce bankruptcy, the only route forward is through bankruptcy 
proceedings, which effectively means liquidating the firm. Liquidation should only occur if 
the value of the assets is higher than the firm as a going concern, but the values of assets in 
                                                 
6 For a more detailed explanation, we refer to the section on Norwegian bankruptcy regulations in Chapter 4. 
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depressed markets are often depressed themselves. As such, we clearly see a tendency in 
claimholders opting for restructurings instead of liquidating financially distressed companies.  
The magnitude and complexity of a financial restructuring greatly differ between cases, and 
depend on the degree to which the company is financially distressed, for example in terms of 
the amount of debt outstanding relative to the cash flow generation in the coming years. 
Another important determinant of the severity of the restructuring process is the willingness 
amongst stakeholders to act in order to resolve the distressed situation permanently. If the 
financial distress is due to cyclical downturns that are expected to pass in due course, creditors 
are probably not incentivised to forego significant portions of their claim. However, if the 
downturn turns out to be lasting, an inadequate initial restructuring could be succeeded by new 
rounds of restructurings, which are most likely to be even more costly for the claimholders. 
We will discuss these considerations and incentives going into financial restructurings in 
greater detail later in this paper. 
Example of a financial restructuring 
Financially distressed companies typically find themselves in the position of being heavily 
burdened by debt in combination with a rapidly diminishing cash flow from operations. 
Simultaneously, the value of their assets will also be affected due to the depressed nature of 
their industry. Experiencing such permanent financial challenges, significant amendments to 
the loan terms must be implemented for the company in order to survive as a going concern.  
At this stage, commonly observed financial restructuring measures from the creditors include 
interests paid as Payment-In-Kind (PIK)7 and implementation of cash sweep mechanisms8, 
conversion of debt, conversion of current bonds in more favourable bonds, and repayment of 
outstanding bonds in the market at a discount to face value (Skudal & Vartdal, 2017). At the 
same time as debtholders discharge on their debt, shareholders are also expected to contribute 
to the survival of the company. Thus, creditors will often insist that equity investors provide 
new cash through issuance of new equity. 
                                                 
7 PIK means that interests are paid as additional claims to the company, thus, reducing the cash flow effect of the loan. 
8 Cash sweep mechanisms imply that interest is only paid in the case of a positive cash flow generation. 
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Exhibit 2.3 shows an example of a typical financial restructuring involving some of the 
measures available to claimholders to change the capital structure in order to ensure the 
survival of the company. Note that we assume a liquidation value of the company’s assets to 
be below the amount of debt outstanding. As such, if the banks find it likely that the company 
will be able to repay the debt at a later time, they will benefit from allowing the firm to 
restructure.   
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2.3 – Example of a financial restructuring solution involving new equity and debt conversion 
The positive effects of the new capital from equity issuance and debt conversion are 
immediately visible on the company’s balance sheet. Additionally, reduced financial expenses 
improves the firm’s liquidity position. However, in terms of claimholder structure, unsecured 
bondholders now find their debt claim converted to equity following the restructuring, also 
suffering a haircut relative to the nominal outstanding of the original bonds. Further, they have 
been relocated from a creditor position, with a contractually agreed right to repayment and 
interests, to a shareholder position only entitled to the company’s cash flow after the remaining 
creditors have received compensation for their claims. Similarly, the downside for existing 
shareholders is that they are heavily diluted in the restructuring and now hold claim to a 
substantially smaller portion of the cash flow generation of the company.  
Overview of the restructuring process 
As emphasised, the complexity of financial restructurings varies between cases. Exhibit 2.4 
tries to conclude the theoretical section of financial restructurings by illustrating the process 
of a typical restructuring, from initiation to implementation.  
Liquidation value
Secured bank debt
Unsecured bond
Equity
Pre-restructuring balance sheet
New equity
Post-restructuring balance sheet
Bond swapped to equity
Old equity
Secured bank debt
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Exhibit 2.4 – Overview of a typical restructuring process, from initiation to implementation 
A typical initiation of a financial restructuring is that the distressed company defaults on its 
debt obligations, or breaching its covenants. Due to cross-default clauses in loan agreements, 
this could lead to a default on all outstanding loans. Following default or a covenant breach, 
the company will ask its creditors for a standstill, which is an agreement between the company 
and its creditors whereby the creditors agree not to take action to collect or enforce their debts 
for a period of time in which a restructuring strategy is formulated. Following the standstill 
agreement, both sides of the negotiation immediately ask their financial and legal advisors to 
conduct due diligences, and the restructuring negotiations commence.  
Present in these negotiations are typically the board and management of the distressed 
company, representatives from the bank, Nordic Trustee, on behalf of the bondholders, given 
that the company has outstanding bond debt, as well as the largest shareholders of the 
company. Once a proposal for a restructuring solution is agreed upon, the company will 
announce the plan, and subsequently summon bondholders to a meeting and call for an 
extraordinary general meeting for shareholders. In their respective meetings, the claimholders 
vote on the deal proposed by the company. Following a potential rejection of the proposal, 
renegotiations will commence in order to find a new solution. If no solution is found out of 
court, the company might file for bankruptcy protection to resolve the situation in court. 
The company, however, has usually received acceptance for the solution proposal from a 
significant portion of the stakeholders before announcing it publicly, reducing the probability 
of the proposal being rejected by the general meeting or by bondholders. When a solution is 
accepted by all groups of stakeholders, implementation immediately follows. The 
implementation process depends on the proposed solution, and often includes issuance of new 
equity and conversion of debt to equity. As a result, the time scope of the whole restructuring 
process varies significantly, from within a few months to a year or more. 
Default and 
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agreement
Financial and 
legal due 
diligence
Restructuring 
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If no agreement is reached, the restructuring process 
will be cancelled and result in liquidation.
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3. Data sample 
In this chapter, we present the restructuring cases included in our sample, as well as the 
financial and operational state of the firms prior to the restructurings.  
Although resolutions of financial distress come in many forms, this thesis is restricted to 
restructurings as defined and introduced in the section explaining the concept of financial 
restructurings. All the companies in our data sample have gone through and completed one or 
several financial restructurings in the period 2015 to the present. We consider the 
restructurings completed once all elements of the solution are implemented. As emphasised, 
our definition distinguishes between refinancing and restructurings. Thus, we have excluded 
firms that have solely changed the payment structure of outstanding debt and firms that have 
resolved the distressed situation through smaller equity issues.   
Our thesis focuses on Norwegian OSV companies, and includes companies operating supply 
ships, AHTSs, subsea and seismic vessels. Further, we restrict the sample to only include 
companies that are listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, thus excluding privately held 
companies, as well as firms that operate exclusively in the capital markets outside Norway. 
Given the time-consuming nature of analysing the restructuring processes, by limiting the 
scope of our thesis to OSV companies that are financially dependent on Norwegian capital 
markets, we effectively allow ourselves to evaluate the restructurings at the necessary level of 
detail. 
To identify the restructuring cases, we have selected companies based on the sample from 
Torstensen and Rasmussen (2017) which fit the criteria of our thesis. Further, we have gone 
through stock exchange notices and media coverage to find additional restructuring cases in 
the last two years, or cases that were not covered in their thesis. As our thesis also seeks to 
understand the current situation of our companies given the restructurings undertaken, we 
exclude companies which have gone through restructurings and subsequently been delisted 
from the Oslo Stock Exchange, due to shortage of public information after the delisting. 
Olympic Ships is an example of such a company.   
We have identified a total of 18 financial restructurings, which are presented in Table 3.1. As 
evident from the table, most offshore companies experienced significant financial distress in 
the wake of the oil price collapse in 2014, consequently having to undergo financial 
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restructurings post year-end 2014. Notably, Electromagnetic Geoservices, Polarcus, Seabird 
and Siem show up more than once, meaning that the companies have gone through several 
restructuring processes. This illustrates the persistently difficult market that oil-related 
industries have gone through. Moreover, it underscores that restructurings are not necessarily 
synonymous with uncomplicated, profitable turnovers. 
 
Table 3.1 – Overview of our sample firms 
Source: Newsweb 
Table 3.1 also indicate elements of the restructuring solutions of each case. Evidently, most 
restructurings, and 13 out of our 18 sample cases, involve extensions of the maturity profile 
of the outstanding debt. Similarly, in 10 of our sample cases, outstanding debt, mostly public 
bonds, was converted to equity. Interestingly, in all but two of our restructuring cases, 
shareholders had to contribute with capital through issuance of new equity.  
Table 3.2 shows the average operational and financial state for our sample prior to the 
restructuring process. The table also show the minimum and maximum observations for our 
companies, reflecting large variation in the multiples within the sample.9 
                                                 
9 A more detailed overview of each restructuring process can be found in Appendix C. 
Cases Offshore segment Solution announcement Solution characteristics
Seabird Exploration Seismic 28.01.2015 Extension, haircut, conversion, equity
Siem Offshore Supply 11.06.2015 Extension, equity
Electromagnetic Geoservices Seismic 04.11.2015 Extension, haircut, equity, buybacks
Polarcus Seismic 05.01.2016 Extension, conversion
Dof Supply 06.06.2016 Haircut, conversion, equity, buybacks
Solstad Offshore Supply 07.06.2016 Extension, equity
Rem Offshore Supply 22.08.2016 Extension, haircut, conversion, equity
Havila Shipping Supply 08.11.2016 Extension, haircut, conversion, equity
Farstad Shipping Supply 03.02.2017 Extension, haircut, conversion, equity
Polarcus 2 Seismic 09.02.2017 Extension, equity
Eidesvik Offshore Supply 01.03.2017 Extension, conversion, equity, buybacks
Electromagnetic Geoservices 2 Seismic 23.03.2017 Haircut, equity, buybacks
Siem Offshore 2 Supply 29.03.2017 Extension, haircut, equity
Seabird Exploration 2 Seismic 26.05.2017 Extension, conversion, equity
Polarcus 3 Seismic 28.01.2018 Extension, haircut, conversion, equity
Electromagnetic Geoservices 3 Seismic 02.03.2018 Equity 
Oceanteam Supply 26.04.2018 Conversion
Seabird Exploration 3 Seismic 24.05.2018 Equity 
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 Table 3.2 – Financial and operational state of our sample firms pre-restructuring 
The offshore sector is a highly capital-intensive industry. An average EBITDA margin on 26% 
implies that 74% of the revenue is operating expenses. Considering the large amount of capital 
investments in fixed assets in the industry, the EBITDA margin is low. Further, the EBITDA 
to net interest-bearing debt indicates what percentage of debt the companies in our sample are 
able to cover on current earnings. On average, this ratio is 15%, clearly reflecting the 
challenging times in the offshore industry. Moreover, the debt-to-capital ratio ranges from 
27% to a maximum of 173%. Arguably, these observations are quite aggressive and an 
indicator of why our sample companies default on their loans, subsequently ending up in a 
restructuring process.  
A Z-score10 below 1.8 means that the company is likely headed for bankruptcy (Altman, 1968). 
Thus, the average Z-score of -1.66 in our sample demonstrates the critical situation the 
companies were experiencing after the oil price collapsed in 2014. It is worth mentioning that 
low earnings render a low Z-score, which explains why Seabird had a Z-score of -10.52, five 
points lower than the second worst. The sample average secured-debt-to-unsecured-debt ratio 
was 2.85, implying that most of the debt in the industry was secured. Further, the price-to-net-
asset-value indicates that investors are only prepared to pay $0.41 on average per $1 net assets. 
The far right column shows that the current ratio on average is clearly below 1, underscoring 
how our sample companies experience difficulties meeting their short-term debt obligations. 
Exhibit 3.1 shows the companies’ average capital structure prior to the restructuring. On the 
left, debt is distributed according to the source of financing, while the right relates to security. 
                                                 
10 Altman’s Z-score is explained in detail in Appendix A. 
Last EBITDA 
margin
EBITDA / 
NIBD
Debt / Capital Z-score
Secured debt / 
Unsecured debt
P/NAV
Current assets / 
Current liabilities
Average 26% 15% 76% -1,66 2,85 0,41 0,41
Min -133% -128% 27% -10,52 0,00 -0,11 0,10
Max 51% 73% 173% 1,28 15,15 1,51 1,83
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Debt constitutes 84% of the company’s average capital structure before the restructuring 
process, measuring equity at market capitalisation.  
 
Exhibit 3.1 – The average capital structure of our sample firms prior to restructuring 
As Exhibit 3.1 shows, bank debt is the prominent financing source in our sample. On average, 
half the capital structure consists of bank debt, while the other half is made up of bond debt 
and equity, with a share of 34% and 16%, respectively. Equity measured at book-value 
amounts to 25%. The low proportion of equity compared to debt gives evidence to the 
substantial gearing in the industry. In addition, the net interest-bearing debt to market 
capitalisation adds up to an average of 26 and underpins the aggressive financing strategies. 
The majority of the sample debt is secured. Of the 84% debt in the sample capital structure, 
secured and unsecured debt hold 64% and 20%, respectively. 
To sum up, our sample consists of 11 OSV companies that have undertaken one or more 
financial restructurings from 2015 to present. These firms were in severe financial distress 
before they started their restructuring-process, as exemplified by the sample’s overall 
depressed Z-score, debt service coverage ratio, and the other measures provided in Table 3.2. 
As mentioned, with an equity averaging around 16%, many of the firms used extensive debt 
financing to invest before the crude oil price collapsed in 2014. 
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4. Banks’ considerations in restructuring processes 
Bank debt is the main source of funding for Norwegian offshore companies11, and it is evident 
from our interviews that almost all bank debt related to our sample firms is secured. Hence, 
being secured lenders on the top of the capital structure, banks are a critical component in 
every restructuring process of a financially distressed company. As our thesis specifically aims 
to explore the role and contributions of banks in the restructuring processes of Norwegian 
offshore companies, this chapter outlines the main considerations of banks in these processes. 
Firstly, we will introduce a model of four key aspects in forming bank behaviour in a 
restructuring process, from which we derive our further discussions. Then we will look in 
further depth into these areas, seen from a bank’s perspective.  
The insights in this chapter are highly influenced by interviews with claimholders, advisors 
and regulators frequently involved in financial restructurings. Out of discretion towards our 
interviewees, we will not specify who contributed with specific insights. However, we would 
emphasise that several sources highlighted most insights. 
Determinants of bank behaviour in financial restructurings 
After thorough investigations of our sample restructurings, as well as valuable insight from 
our interviewees, we recognise that the outcome of a financial restructuring, in terms of which 
measures are included in the implemented solution, is largely dependent on four key aspects. 
We argue that the four main determinants of bank behaviour are the current financial status of 
the distressed firm, the targeted capital structure post-restructuring, the banks’ legal options 
and the stakeholder dynamics, as shown in Exhibit 4.112. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Out of our sample firms, bank debt averages at 50% of the capital structure when measuring equity at market value. 
12 The model is inspired by one presented in: Experiences from Financial Restructurings - “A Practitioner’s View” during the 
JUC Network for Restructuring & Insolvency Conference, 12.02.18 (Jakob Irgens, DNB). 
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Exhibit 4.1 – The four key determinants of bank behaviour in a financial restructuring 
When initiating a restructuring process of a company to which it has outstanding claims, it is 
critical for a bank to find an accurate financial diagnosis of the distressed firm. Similarly, the 
bank has to find a sustainable target capital structure of the company post restructuring which 
enables the firm to survive the current downturn and facilitates growth when the market 
eventually improves. At the same time, other relevant aspects affecting the choice of initiated 
measures include the legal options available to the banks and, most importantly, the 
interactions with other stakeholders in the process.  
Existing financial status vs. targeted capital structure post-restructuring 
In order to fully comprehend the financial situation of the distressed company, a bank spends 
a significant amount of time in the early stages of restructurings, together with their financial 
advisors and other banks in the syndicate, on thorough due diligence. Given the liquidity-
constrained nature of a restructuring company, considerable time is spent estimating values of 
the vessels and the company’s contracts’ ability to generate cash flow. Banks and other 
creditors will have to agree on some underlying operational assumptions of the market going 
forward during these valuation procedures. This can prove challenging due to conflicting 
Stakeholder dynamics 
• Aligning banks’ interests
• Complexity of debt seniority
• Timeline of the process
Outcome of
restructuring
Target capital structure
• Amount of fresh new equity
• Availability of equity
• Level of indebtedness 
Legal aspects
• Bankruptcy legislation
• Jurisdictional differences
• Banking regulations and 
capital requirements
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4
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incentives amongst banks with different exposure, maturity and seniority within the syndicate. 
We will elaborate further on such stakeholder dynamics later in this chapter. 
When working on a restructuring solution, it is of high priority for banks to turn the company 
to a state where it becomes as creditworthy as possible. Thus, finding a sustainable level of 
debt and designing a future capital structure enabling the company to remain a going concern 
is vital. Interestingly, the incentives for banks in this process are somewhat conflicting with 
those of company management and investors. As banks only hold claim on the face value of 
the loan, plus interest, the return on the debt is capped to the contractually agreed terms. This 
limits the upside potential if the company is successfully and profitably restructured. 
Considering this, banks are not willing to forego more outstanding debt than critically 
necessary for the company to resolve the distressed financial situation. Moreover, for banks to 
waive claims, they typically demand the owners to contribute as well, often requiring the 
company’s post-restructured capital structure to contain substantial new fresh equity. The 
availability of this equity is also a relevant aspect in forming the outcome of the restructuring. 
Generally, the banks strive to retain financially robust owners with industrial experience and 
long-term perspective to contribute with equity if necessary. Thus, banks will typically prefer 
that the existing shareholders contribute with new equity.  
After going through the financials of the distressed company, having worked closely with 
financial advisors and other banks involved in the process, the banks should be able to assess 
the extent to which the situation is a matter of depressed liquidity or solidity, as well as which 
measures are necessary to remedy the situation. Depressed liquidity implies that banks can 
impose somewhat softer measures, offering the firm sufficient runway13 to weather the storm 
until the market recovers. Such measures include amending and extending current debt 
agreements, and may entail covenant waivers, rescheduling of interest and amortisation, and 
extending maturities. However, if the current market conditions do not improve significantly 
during the extension period, these deferrals are likely to end up as so-called “kick the can”-
solutions, referring to situations where the restructurings do not rectify the mismatch between 
current liquidity and debt obligations, but solely postpone the issues pending a market 
upswing. 
                                                 
13 The period a firm is able to operate given the current market conditions without defaulting on its debt. 
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More drastic alternatives to extensions are annulments of debt or taking possession of the 
collateral. However, particularly related to the latter, banks shy away from such measures as 
they do not consider themselves qualified to own assets as they do not possess the skill or 
capacity to operate the vessels. Moreover, in taking the asset, the banks will also lose any 
backlog or contract tied to it. As emphasised, in a distressed OSV market, a contract would be 
a substantial part of a vessel’s value. In addition, considering that companies like Dof, Farstad 
and Siem operated as many as 50-70 vessels each pre-restructuring, taking collateral in order 
to sell the ships to other industry players would obviously not create a seller’s market, further 
depressing prices. 
Consequently, the most viable option of cancelling outstanding debt is by conversion of debt 
to equity, effectively taking an ownership position in the firm. One can argue that banks, 
ceteris paribus, should be instrument agnostic and thus indifferent to holding an equivalent 
amount of debt in equity. However, similarly to seizing assets, banks typically do not possess 
the competencies to derive value from a shareholder position, nor is a bank necessarily 
mandated to change the bank’s relationship with the distressed company from being a lender 
to becoming a major shareholder. If the bank converts to equity, in terms of value 
conservation, it also immediately risks that the stock market expects it to inevitably sell the 
converted shares in the market. This would again put a downward pressure on the stock as 
long as the bank retains its ownership position. Another reason why banks prefer to own debt 
instead of equity is due to capital requirements imposed by the authorities. Due to regulations 
on capital adequacy, when lending out, Norwegian banks will have to have equity coverage 
of 16.5%. On the other hand, if banks were to convert debt to equity, the loan turns to an 
investment and the bank must have a 100% equity coverage. Naturally, holding stocks is 
relatively more expensive, and thus correspondingly unattractive.  
The majority of our sample companies’ financing is bank debt. A company usually has several 
banks providing financing and, naturally, the banks are normally exposed to several companies 
within the same sector. In terms of the latter, this arguably provides the banks with a unique 
possibility to dictate terms throughout an industry if restructurings are needed in several 
companies within the same industry. Considering the OSV industry, a particular emphasis is 
placed on the market balance and the oversupply of vessels. Being universal creditors, banks 
are in pole position to address these issues when restructuring the companies. Measures 
targeting these issues are, for example, scrapping of vessels and enhanced consolidation. 
However, there are also some drawbacks with being extensively exposed throughout an 
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industry. As both the financial industry and the industrial communities in Norway, especially 
in the offshore sectors, are quite small, the terms given to different companies are rather 
transparent. Thus, if banks were to give favourable terms to one company, they would 
essentially be forced to give equal treatment to all the firms in the same industry. Clearly, this 
is particularly pressing if considering reducing outstanding debt, as the cancellation of debt in 
one case would effectively lead to banks having to cut elsewhere as well. This mechanism was 
brought up to date in autumn 2019 when DNB published a stock notice regarding a loan loss 
provision of NOK 1 billion related to an unspecified customer. The initial opinion in the 
market was that this was linked to ongoing offshore restructurings, and the share price reacted 
down 3% on the news, effectively reducing the market value of the bank by NOK 6 billion. 
Arguably, this overreaction illustrated the notion that misfortunes never come singly, and that 
if DNB takes losses in one offshore restructuring, the fear is that it has to do so in all of them. 
It is worth mentioning that the perception of a financial restructuring as solely negative for the 
banks does not necessarily provide a nuanced picture of the financial outcomes for the banks 
involved in such processes. During these processes, banks can choose to provide additional 
financing, either by taking over another bank’s exposure or extending and increasing existing 
credit lines pending the outcome of the restructuring. Increasing the exposure to distressed 
companies also comes with significant risk and, as is evident from our interviews, does only 
occur in cases related to shortage of liquidity rather than cases involving lack of solidity.  
The legal aspects  
There are several legal aspects affecting the behaviour of banks in financial restructurings, 
including procedural regulations and differences in jurisdiction, as well as capital requirements 
and banking regulations.  
Norwegian bankruptcy legislation 
Under Norwegian bankruptcy legislation, a financially distressed company has two 
alternatives to bankruptcy: a voluntary debt settlement or a compulsory debt settlement. The 
former can include the tools suggested by the law14, as well as any measure the stakeholders 
                                                 
14 In particular, court-mandated tools are (i) deferment of payment, (ii) a reduction of debt, and (iii) a liquidation of the 
debtor’s assets with an equal reduction in the debtor’s debt (Skudal & Vartdal, 2017).   
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involved see fit. Solutions in a compulsory debt settlement, however, are severely restricted 
to only containing the tools suggested by the law. In addition, it requires a minimum dividend 
of 25% to all unsecured creditors. Hence, from a bank’s point of view, the legislation is made 
in order to protect junior lenders and will not sufficiently compensate secured creditors. To 
implement a solution negotiated in court, a voluntary debt settlement requires a unanimous 
vote in favour of the proposed restructuring solution, while the compulsory debt solution 
requires three-quarters of the votes from all affected creditors. Thus, as the voluntary debt 
settlement is challenging to achieve and the compulsory settlement is usually deemed highly 
unreasonable, the in-court restructuring alternatives are largely perceived by banks as a choice 
between two evils. 
Notably, Skudal and Vartdal (2017) find that Norwegian bankruptcy legislation does not 
facilitate a high firm survival rate. In fact, of their 26 sample firms undertaking in-court 
settlement procedures, only four survived the restructurings. This is consistent with the 
findings of Villars-Dahl’s Norwegian Official Report (2016), which found that 81% of the 114 
debt settlements that proceeded in the Norwegian bankruptcy court between 2006 and 2015 
ended in company bankruptcy. The report concludes that in order to increase the number of 
successful in-court debt settlements, the Norwegian bankruptcy laws must provide more 
flexibility for larger reconstructions of the companies.  
A third option in Norwegian bankruptcy legislation is filing for bankruptcy proceedings. 
However, this process is also considered highly dysfunctional by banks. Bankruptcies usually 
involve an official receiver liquidating the firm’s assets on behalf of the creditors. The receiver 
is often accused of spending extensive amounts of time identifying priorities and distributing 
the values across creditors. Conversely, if the official receivers deem the process too messy, 
as would probably be the case in a process involving a number of old supply vessels, they can 
easily abandon the collateral back to the banks. As emphasised, fire sales of assets do not 
exactly create a seller’s market. The lack of productive methods available in court 
substantiates the banks’ unwillingness to go through courtroom proceedings, favouring private 
workouts instead. 
Jurisdiction differences on bankruptcy legislation  
Due to the unpredictable nature of the outcomes in Norwegian bankruptcy legislation, both 
bondholders and shareholders will use the threat of the company filing for bankruptcy as 
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leverage in restructuring negotiations with the secured banks. Conversely, the banks will have 
similar leverage in threatening to go through in-court proceedings in a different jurisdiction.15 
In other countries, such as in the US, in-court restructuring is a more feasible option for banks 
as the procedures are significantly more structured and because it is more difficult for single 
creditors to block a restructuring proposal. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, all 
creditors are grouped into various creditor classes based on seniority, for instance, secured and 
unsecured creditors belong to separate classes. Subsequently, each class needs three-fourths 
approval to pass a proposal, thus leaving less room for individual creditors to throw a spanner 
in the works for the collectively agreed solution proposal. Secondly, in what is called a “cram 
down”, the judge can approve a plan even though some creditors are objecting to it. For the 
cram down to be approved, the judge must be convinced that the solution proposal complies 
with certain criteria, essentially being that it is feasible, has honest intentions and is applicable 
by law. Moreover, the judge must be convinced that the restructuring will not be subject to a 
subsequent restructuring or liquidation shortly following implementation.  
Capital requirements and banking regulations 
Banks are subject to regulations and capital requirements influencing their behaviour in 
financial restructurings. The EU Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) introduces 
requirements for equity, long-term funding and liquidity (DNB, 2018). CRD IV comprises 
three pillars, the first of which concerns capital adequacy and risk assessment, and is thus 
particularly relevant when considering restructurings.  
Exhibit 4.2 provides the requirements for each of the three capital classifications of Pillar 1, 
as well as the leverage ratio requirement by the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway 
(FSA). Notably, the risk-weighted assets are computed using the banks’ proprietary internal 
ratings-based (IRB) models. These models are not publicly disclosed, but must be approved 
by the FSA. 
                                                 
15 Given that there are formal and legal grounds for the company being eligible for judicial proceedings abroad. 
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Exhibit 4.2 – Capital adequancy requirements for Norwegian banks 
Source: The Financial Supervisory Authority 
Due to CRD IV regulations, if banks were to partially write-off on a loan engagement through 
a restructuring, they would also have to reclassify any remaining debt associated with the 
original loan to a riskier asset class when calculating its risk-weighted asset measure. Such 
reclassifications effectively lower the banks’ lending capacity, emphasising banks’ reluctance 
to write off on outstanding debt.  
In terms of banks reporting losses and impairments, the new IFRS 9 regulations introduce a 
model based on evaluations of expected losses. IFRS 9 replaces the old “incurred loss model” 
under IAS 39, which assumed that all loans will be repaid until evidence to the contrary, known 
as a trigger event, is identified. Hence, under IFRS 9, losses are recognised earlier than in the 
incurred loss model. In contrast, impairments after IAS 39 have been heavily criticised as 
being reported too late and being too small. This was on the agenda particularly in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. As with debt issued to other cyclical industries, the 
probability of offshore firms defaulting is largely dependent on the macroeconomic 
fluctuations. Consequently, based on the new model, the latest downturn in the OSV industry 
should arguably affect the banks’ balance sheets, and could in turn impact measures included 
in the restructuring solution. 
When calculating expected credit losses, the banks’ reporting must reflect an unbiased 
evaluation of a range of possible outcomes and their probabilities of occurrence. Moreover, 
this assessment must be based on reasonable and supportable information about past events, 
current conditions and forecasts of future economic conditions (PWC, 2017). In practice, the 
banks are required to identify different scenarios related to the outcome of the debt issued to 
the offshore companies, and evaluate the probabilities of these scenarios up against each other. 
An assessment includes macroeconomic assumptions, as well as industry-specific forecasts, 
typically from financial analysts and shipbrokers. Shipbrokers also have a particularly relevant 
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role in determining the value of the vessels used as collateral in the vast majority of loans 
issued to the industry. 
Stakeholder dynamics  
Parties regularly engaged in financial restructurings have described the process to us as 
negotiations involving chaos, game theory and unexpected use of atomic bombs. Somewhat 
more diplomatically phrased, one of our interviewees referred to restructurings as “never a 
dull moment”. Regardless, restructurings require stakeholders with often completely different 
priorities and agendas to agree on a solution protecting the company from a value destructive 
bankruptcy. However, designing a restructuring which saves the company at the same time as 
it preserves all stakeholders’ interests is fairly unrealistic. Thus, finding a solution in which 
there is an equal level of dissatisfaction is probably the best stakeholders can hope for. 
As Exhibit 4.3 illustrates, in order to prevent destruction of values for the restructuring firm, 
there must be an internal balance between the different stakeholders involved in the process. 
Banks, usually on the top of the capital structure having first priority in restructurings, hold a 
key role in securing such balance. In the following section, we will elaborate on the different 
dynamics banks’ experience with other stakeholders participating in the restructuring. 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 4.3 – Balancing stakeholder interest in financial restructurings 
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Other banks 
From our interviews, we find that the most time-consuming part of the restructuring process 
for a bank is often to align interests with the other banks holding claim to the distressed 
company. The conflicts are primarily due to financial exposure, risk ability and willingness, 
and a bank’s strategy going into the restructurings. 
In the OSV industry, bank debt often takes the form of several small facilities, using vessels 
as collateral. Rather than expanding existing credit lines, the company takes on new facilities 
when financing new vessels. Consequently, a company operating 40 vessels might have an 
equal amount of bank facilities. Given that these vessels are not necessarily acquired at the 
same time, each facility will probably involve different gearing profiles as older vessels have 
had cash-flow generation over a longer period of time paying down on the loans. Hence, when 
working towards collective measures within the banking syndicate, for instance reducing 
interest payments and amortisation, the various banks might have rather conflicting interests 
in terms of which reductions seem fair to the respective banks. In addition, the loan facilities 
often have different maturities. This could trigger arguments between banks on whether all 
facilities should be extended equally with the same number of years, or if all maturities should 
be set to the same year. Furthermore, consistently financing with new facilities also leads to 
disagreements over the quality of the respective banks’ collateral, as the vessels differ in age, 
operating status and availability to customers (i.e. on contract, warm-stacked, cold-stacked)16.  
Within a banking syndicate, there are likely to be banks with conflicting strategies and 
mandates. Some of our sample firms are up for new rounds of restructurings, and have publicly 
expressed that banks’ unwillingness to remain exposed to the offshore industry have made it 
difficult to refinance existing debt. As such, if a bank holds the OSV-industry as an “exit”-
sector, this would obviously be challenging for the rest of the syndicate as other banks risk 
suffering haircuts on outstanding debt or buy out the exiting bank’s exposure. In order to 
accept taking over the risk, the acquiring banks will demand a significant discount, about 
which the exiting bank is generally reluctant. Hence, in processes with such clear fronts up 
against each other within the banking syndicate, a restructuring is more likely to end with 
                                                 
16 A warm-stacked vessel is laid up for an expected period of less than twelve months. The machinery on board is operative 
in case a sudden recommissioning is required. When cold-stacked, a vessel is practically shut down, and is expected to be 
idle for at least 12 months. 
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bankruptcy proceedings, as was the case with IM Skaugen in 2018 (Lund & Ekeseth, 2018). 
Further, as a syndicate grows large, there often tends to be considerable differences between 
the banks in terms of size and resources. Our understanding from interviews with other 
stakeholders is that the larger banks are usually fairly constructive when initiating the 
negotiations, while smaller banks attempts to delay the processes, essentially hoping to be 
bailed out by the largest banks.  
In terms of domicile, we have also learned that local banks with personal commitments to the 
debtor often find larger banks to be more cynically inclined. This could lead to more distant 
banks putting pressure on the local banks to bail them out. Additionally, expanding the 
geographical perspective, if the syndicate includes banks from various nationalities, 
differences in terms of investment strategies and mandates, as well as culture, often change 
the dynamics in the negotiations. Typically, if there are banks with clear political agendas, this 
could complicate the process and prove challenging when trying to find reasonable solutions. 
Troubles due to so-called “Chinese calculators” are seemingly well known amongst banks 
involved in restructuring processes, and refer to situations where foreign banks are restrained 
by political interests and connections. Moreover, differences in nationalities can also indicate 
the extent to which the banks are likely to accept losses. Gjønnes (2017) explains how 
Singaporean or US banks are more willing than their Norwegian counterparts to cut their 
losses and move on to new engagements. 
Being universal creditors, banks should be uniquely positioned to facilitate restructuring 
solutions of which the outcomes increase the likelihood of the banks getting their outstanding 
offshore debt repaid. However, most of this debt is tied to vessels as collateral. As such, the 
recent downturn has not only put the values on these vessels under immense pressure, it has 
also illustrated how the current market is considerably oversupplied. The only way to ensure 
a more balanced market is to take vessels out of the market. Importantly, for banks to initiate 
an industry-wide scrapping effort, we argue that there must be a system in place to compensate 
the creditors with collateral in the ships that are eventually scrapped. This depends on banks’ 
ability to coordinate and work together.  
GIEK  
Another important creditor in the restructuring negotiations is the export credit guarantee 
agencies. In our sample, agencies involved in the restructurings have also been foreign, as, for 
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instance, the Brazilian agency. In this thesis, we will mostly refer to the Norwegian agency, 
GIEK. GIEK provides long-term guarantees on behalf of the Norwegian state, largely on the 
same terms as the banks. Typically, when a Norwegian ship owner finances the acquisition of 
a newbuild, 30% of the debt is guaranteed by banks and the remaining 70% is guaranteed by 
GIEK (Torstensen & Rasmussen, 2017). This provides GIEK with significant risk in 
restructurings, and as such, it has quite similar motives and priorities as banks going into the 
process.  
Despite some differences in incentives and restrictions, GIEK will be treated as one of the 
banks when results are presented in this thesis. This is due to limited information on the 
distribution of debt between GIEK and banks within each specific case, and their highly 
coinciding interests. 
Bondholders 
It is important to separate between secured and unsecured bond debt, as secured bond debt has 
many of the same characteristics as bank debt, while unsecured bond debt differs significantly. 
Thus, secured bondholders are typically treated similarly to secured banks. In contrast, 
unsecured bondholders have no collateral and would receive little to nothing in a liquidation 
scenario.  
Most bonds are listed, which implies that bondholders have their holdings continuously valued 
in financial markets. Thus, going into a restructuring, they are perfectly aware of the 
deteriorated nature of their investment. As a result, the investments are likely to already have 
been booked as impairments on investments in their financial statements. Hence, with the loss 
being behind them, bondholders are essentially left with an option on the market to recover, 
the value of which is known as the holdout value. This option could cause some bondholders 
to sit back and postpone the process. Further, during the last wave of Norwegian restructurings, 
there were a lot of murmuring amongst bond investors claiming unfair treatment from the 
secured banks. Bondholders were particularly criticising what they perceived as 
disproportionate loss relative to banks and shareholders, which substantiates the notion of 
upset bondholders potentially behaving irrationally, delaying the restructuring. Due to the 
need for two-thirds approval from bondholders in a private workout, in theory, unsecured 
bondholders tend to be in a position to push banks in a favourable direction. 
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Bondholders are a fragmented group of investors, with whom the banks have different 
relationships. A bondholder group who could prove helpful for banks, but on the other hand 
complicate the restructuring process for other investors, are vulture funds. These funds invest 
in bonds issued by distressed companies with the sole intention of speculating in recovery of 
the bonds. For instance, if these funds acquire the bonds at 20% of face value, they might be 
satisfied with a restructuring solution buying back the bonds at 40% of par, yielding a return 
of 100% for the vulture funds. Hence, in terms of having bondholders agreeing to a solution 
involving substantial haircuts on outstanding unsecured debt, these funds could prove 
beneficial to banks. Another group of bondholders the banks need to take into consideration 
are the industrial players. These players might have strategic motives when buying debt in the 
distressed companies, as Aker had when they bought more than a third of Rem’s outstanding 
bond debt during Rem’s restructuring, effectively blocking any solution not involving Rem to 
become a part of the Aker-controlled Solstad (Aadland, 2016). Bonds issued by these 
distressed companies are typically traded at a significant discount to par. Thus, for industrial 
players with bigger financial muscles, this need not be a particularly expensive way of seizing 
significant control over another company’s future. 
Shareholders 
Similar to bondholders, the ability to delay a restructuring can be considered a call option on 
the market to recover. As restructuring processes may take years to complete, market recovery 
in that period is possible. Notably, most shareholder value is lost prior to when the 
restructuring commences. In addition, given the likely outcome of new equity substantially 
diluting existing shareholders, the upside potential associated with avoiding restructuring, 
equalling the holdout value, can be massive. According to Franks and Torous (1989), any 
compensation to shareholders in violation of the APR can be considered a payment for this 
option.  
In some cases – as is the case in some of our sample firms – existing shareholders also have 
leverage over banks, given their invaluable industry experience. Norwegian ship owners are 
often owned by families who have been involved in the industry for decades. As discussed, 
banks are reluctant to take control of a company and will strive to keep these families as 
majority owners, favouring them when distributing ownership shares. Moreover, interviewees 
have emphasised the importance of having such owners as a part of the negotiation processes. 
Arguably, as these owners have their skin in the game to a larger extent than other 
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stakeholders, they are pivotal in driving the negotiations forward. Interestingly, although 
outside of our sample, in the failed restructuring of the drilling company Dolphin Drilling last 
year, claimholders involved in the process have argued that the absence of the controlling 
owner, Fred Olsen, as a driving force in the restructuring, negatively impacted the outcome.  
In restructurings, one can never underestimate the influence of new capital and unimportance 
of the old. The contributors of equity in a restructuring will find themselves in control of the 
firm post-restructuring, and naturally, the banks are eager to find suitable owners, increasing 
the likelihood of leading the company towards a more creditworthy future. Conversely, if 
banks were to have bondholders convert all their debt to equity, bondholders would essentially 
seize control of the company. Due to the fragmented nature of bond investors, banks pursue 
solutions avoiding this. Hence, an alternative to issuing equity to existing shareholders is to 
find new owners. Due to the high risk involved, financial investors are likely to stay cautious 
about investing heavily in restructuring cases. Consequently, reaching out to new industrial 
owners is probably a more viable alternative. For an industrial owner, a company undergoing 
financial restructuring can be considered as a cheap M&A target, both for competitors and 
companies elsewhere in the value chain (Torstensen & Rasmussen, 2017). However, for an 
industrial player, it must make more sense economically to consider M&A than to buy the 
target company’s assets at very low prices in a potential liquidation scenario. 
Advisors and other contributing parties 
Exhibit 4.4 provides an illustration of which resources banks bring to the table, and at what 
time, during a restructuring process. Given the complexity and time-consuming nature of all 
the restructurings in our sample, it is our understanding that all of these resources have been 
involved in the processes.  
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Exhibit 4.4 – When and where resources are needed in restructuring processes  
Notably, legal and financial advisors are highly involved in restructuring processes. Arguably, 
in negotiations including up to 20-30 credit institutions17, fragmented groups of bond 
investors, shareholders, company management, customers and other third parties, there is a 
desperate need for coordinating stakeholder interests, supervise legal concerns and administer 
practical matters. Moreover, advisors have an important role in reality orientating their clients. 
In order to succeed, there has to be unequivocal unanimity amongst the stakeholders in who 
has priority first, second and so on. Having competent advisors with experience from previous 
restructurings enables this, making the negotiations more productive, increasing the 
probability of a successful outcome.  
Although a Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO) is more commonly used in private workouts in 
the US, we acknowledge that for all practical matters, Norwegian restructurings also involve 
a corresponding role with more or less the same assignments. A CRO is basically a 
professional whistleblower employed by the banks or other stakeholders to work closely with 
the distressed company, monitoring the actions of the management and board of directors. The 
aim of including a CRO in the process is to be certain that the company is constantly in 
                                                 
17 The most extreme example is the restructuring of Seadrill last year, with a total of 42 banks involved, with an estimated 
total of up to $250m in restructuring costs. 
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compliance with the terms of the standstill agreement, or any other agreements pending the 
outcome of the restructuring process.  
The time scope of the whole restructuring process varies significantly, from within a few 
months to more than a year. As discussed, there are considerable differences in agendas and 
priorities, as well as experience and knowledge, between the involved parties. Moreover, the 
negotiation processes are often immensely expensive, and although financial advisors tend to 
take a success fee, the lawyers often bill by the hour. The costliness of a restructuring process 
varies greatly from case to case; however, it is our understanding from interviewees that costs 
up to NOK 80-100 million are not unusual. Restructuring costs are generally covered by the 
companies, and will consequently impact on the size of the cake the negotiating parties are 
essentially discussing how to distribute. 
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5. Post-restructuring analysis of bank contributions 
In this chapter, we will investigate the outcomes of our sample cases. Specifically, our 
emphasis is on the contributions of banks being the key creditor. Firstly, we will examine the 
outcomes of bank debt, in terms of the measures included in the implemented solution and the 
extent to which bank debt was affected in the restructuring outcome. Secondly, we will review 
the role of banks and the relationships with other stakeholders involved in the process, 
followed by a brief discussion on the assumption of APR in our sample. Lastly, we will 
conclude the post-restructuring analysis by evaluating what was essentially done – and what 
was not. 
Torstensen and Rasmussen (2017) labelled the restructuring negotiations “a room where 
everyone has a loaded gun”. As such, we argue that the outcome of bank debt suggests that 
banks came out of the processes practically unharmed, naming the first section “Dodging the 
bullet”. Furthermore, the position of banks as secured creditors made them in charge of most 
of the negotiations, enabling them to dictate the terms and outcomes for other stakeholders. 
Consequently, the second section is called “The alpha dogs”. The third section, “The go-to 
guys”, discusses the extent to which banks favoured shareholders at the expense of unsecured 
bondholders, violating the APR assumption. Finally, in the section “What is done and what is 
next”, we evaluate the solutions that were ultimately implemented. 
Dodging the bullet  
Bank debt is by far the most important source of financing in our restructuring cases. Out of 
the 11 firms, 10 have had bank debt. In total, 82% of all outstanding debt in our sample relates 
to bank debt. This demonstrates the position of banks and their ability to set the terms of the 
negotiations with company management and other stakeholders. As emphasised, banks are 
generally exceptionally reluctant to waive outstanding debt. Assuming the APR holds, junior 
claimholders receive financial consideration only after creditors with higher seniority have 
been fully paid. Thus, one should expect banks not to forego any debt before stakeholders with 
lower seniority have taken a substantial hit on their outstanding claim.  
Table 5.1 provides an overview of the outcome for outstanding bank debt in our sample 
restructurings. Notably, there were only two cases where banks took a haircut. This 
demonstrates the banks’ reluctance to forego any debt. Further, three cases included banks 
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converting debt to equity. Significantly more often, the banks agreed to amendments to the 
payment structure and maturity profile. In total, eight cases involved reductions in 
amortisation18, while the maturity on the loans was extended in nine of the cases involving 
bank debt. Interestingly, the most common measure included by the banks in the restructuring 
solutions was covenant changes. This demonstrates how banks go to great lengths in order to 
avoid cancelling on loan engagements. In addition, it illustrates how banks, being on the top 
of the capital structure, have the ability to dictate the restructuring solutions to favour them. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 – Overview of outcome for bank debt in our sample restructurings 
 
Debt reductions 
Obviously, when your whole business model evolves around profiting from lending out, to 
waive outstanding debt is a bitter pill to swallow for banks. Moreover, almost all bank debt in 
our sample is secured. Hence, as banks are disinclined to reduce the nominal outstanding level 
of debt and most often have priority over other creditors, the amount of debt being cancelled 
in restructuring processes should be limited. In our sample, the level of bank debt is essentially 
unchanged post-restructuring. Reductions in the banks’ debt claims corresponded to only 2% 
of the nominal outstanding prior to the restructurings. 
In three cases, being the Farstad, Havila and one of the Seabird restructurings, banks ended up 
converting debt to equity. In the former, banks took a 31% ownership share post-restructuring. 
In the Havila case, banks ended up controlling around 20% of the company. DNB and 
Swedbank each took a minority stake of 10% and 5%, respectively. The last case involving 
                                                 
18 Reduced amortisation means deferral of amortisation payments, often for an agreed period of time post-restructuring. The 
deferred instalments are usually paid at maturity and should not be confused with cancellation of outstanding debt. 
Cases with bank debt: 14 Number of cases Share of cases Average Max Min
Cash redemption 0 0% 0% 0% 0%
Haircut 2 14% 7% 7% 7%
Conversion to equity 3 21% 33% 83% 5%
Reduced amortisation
(% of outstanding)
8 57% 22% 34% 7%
Maturity extension
(years)
9 64% 3.5 5.0 2.2
Covenant changes 11 79%
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debt conversion is the second restructuring round in Seabird, in which 87% of the bank debt 
was converted to equity. Notably, such conversion rates of secured bank debt are rare, 
illustrated by conversion rates of 3% and 11% in the Farstad and Havila cases. It should be 
noted that the Seabird case involved significantly less bank debt than the former two. 
Moreover, the credit institution partially waiving its claim was American, which tallies well 
with our understanding from interviews that American banks more often than their Norwegian 
counterparts in restructuring processes are willing to take losses and get on with other 
engagements. 
As discussed, there is an obvious reluctance amongst banks to take haircuts on outstanding 
debt. In our sample, only the banks engaged in the Farstad and Havila restructurings reduced 
the nominal outstanding level of debt. The former restructuring solution involved banks taking 
a haircut of 7%. In the latter, the company had to sell non-core vessels and the remaining debt 
connected to the sold vessels were treated as haircuts. Further, we find no cases involving cash 
redemption of bank debts. Intuitively, the low frequency of debt being redeemed in cash relates 
to the liquidity-constrained nature of our sample firms. 
Significantly more often than reducing debt, banks agreed to reduce and defer amortisations. 
The reductions ranged from 7% to 22% of the total outstanding debt. With an average 
amortisation reduction of 10%, the reduction usually entailed a 50-100% deferral of payment 
for three years on average. For the distressed companies, as the deferred instalments are 
usually paid at maturity, reduced amortisation does not mean reduced debt in absolute terms; 
however, it does provide a much-needed liquidity relief. 
 
Extensions and runway length 
The previous chapter on banks’ considerations going into a restructuring gave insight into how 
banks impose softer measures, such as amending and extending current debt agreements, to 
offer the firm sufficient runway to weather the storm until the market recovers. Maturity 
extensions were included in nine cases, and averaged around three and a half years, ranging 
from around two years to five years. In 11 of the cases, covenants were changed or annulled. 
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Exhibit 5.1 shows the development in the debt maturity profiles of our sample firms, including 
both balloon payments at maturity and amortisation. The dark columns represent the amount 
of debt payable at different maturities prior to the restructurings, while the grey columns, on 
the other hand, illustrate the amount payable with extended maturities. The payment profile 
post-restructuring is visibly skewed towards the end of the time horizon, which is reasonable 
given that most of our pre-restructured debt was due around 2016 and 2017 and that the 
average extension was three and a half years. Further, the chart substantiates our findings of 
only a limited decrease in bank debt obligations for our sample firms.  
 
Exhibit 5.1 – Maturity profiles of pre- and post-restructured bank debt in our sample 
Summing up in terms of measures imposed by banks, the banks have chosen to kick the can a 
few years down the road, and extended the maturity of the debt rather than reducing the 
nominal outstanding. In addition, banks have changed covenants and contributed through 
deferred and reduced amortisation easing the imminent liquidity strain. Moreover, we find 
only a few examples of banks converting debt to equity and thus taking ownership positions 
in the restructured companies. This is consistent with earlier research on restructurings, for 
example by Asquith et al. (1994), and our discussions on bank incentives and considerations 
in chapter four. 
The alpha dogs 
For banks to agree to a restructuring solution entailing them amending and extending debt 
agreements, they usually demand that other creditors and shareholders contribute equally. In 
our cases, bondholders generally accepted similar amendments and maturity extensions as 
those agreed to by the banks. However, as their claims hold less seniority, bondholders are 
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significantly more exposed to losses on outstanding debt. Similarly, shareholders, being on 
the bottom of the capital structure, are equally likely to have their ownership position reduced 
through issuance of new equity.  
Exhibit 5.2 illustrates the different contributions from the main claimholders. Overall, 
shareholders contributed in all but two of the cases. Bondholders and banks contributed in 13 
and 10 cases, respectively. 
 
Exhibit 5.2 – Contributions from the different claimholders, number of cases 
Contributions not included: Covenant changes and interest changes 
As we can see, banks have not agreed to contribute alone in any of our cases. Similarly, only 
one case involved creditors solving the distressed situation without demanding new equity 
from shareholders. Considering the seniority of their claims, this comes as no surprise. Further, 
in two cases, banks and shareholders resolved the situation without the contribution of 
bondholders. In both Polarcus’ second restructuring and in the first Siem case, the bondholders 
played no part in the solution implemented despite banks contributing with reduced 
amortisation and maturity extensions. However, in these cases the initiated measures were 
related to imminent bank repayments with maturities within months, whereas the maturities 
on the outstanding bonds were already years ahead. Hence, the notion of banks not incurring 
losses without less senior claimholders taking substantial hits is presumably intact, in line with 
James (1995), as discussed in our literature review.  
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Banks and bondholders 
There is a clear difference between secured and unsecured bondholders in terms of priority. 
As unsecured bondholders receive nothing in a liquidation scenario, one would expect these 
creditors to end up significantly worse off than their secured counterparts. All of our sample 
firms had bond debt as a part of their capital structure, and while all restructuring cases 
involved bond debt, there were only six cases with secured bond debt.  
 
Table 5.2 – Outcome of bond debt relative to bank debt 
Table 5.2 shows the post-restructured outcome of bond debt, both secured and unsecured, 
relative to bank debt. The table illustrates the extent to which the debt remained, was converted 
to equity, redeemed in cash or ultimately reduced as haircut on the nominal outstanding. 
Interestingly, secured bondholders were left with substantially less in nominal terms than 
secured banks. Whereas 98% of secured bank debt remained post-restructuring, out of the 
original secured bond debt, only 67% persisted. Moreover, 16% of the secured bond debt was 
converted to equity and an equal share was reduced as haircut on the nominal outstanding.  
As only a handful of cases involved secured bond debt, a few restructurings stand out. 
Specifically, the first Seabird case involved a 53% haircut on the secured bond debt, while the 
remaining 47% were either converted to equity or into a new secured bond (SBX04). Notably, 
85% of the SBX04 bond were converted to equity in the second round of restructuring two 
years later. Similarly, Polarcus’ first restructuring included 15% haircut on the secured debt. 
The other three cases involving secured debt prompted no reductions in outstanding debt. 
Nevertheless, the maturities were extended in two of the cases. 
As secured bond debt has many of the same characteristics as bank debt, the considerable 
difference in recovered debt is somewhat surprising. One explanation for this could be the 
quality of the collateral. A clear distinction between banks and bondholders that we have come 
Bank debt
( Observations: 13)
Secured bonds
(Observations: 5)
Unsecured bonds
(Observations: 15)
Remaining debt 98% 67% 38%
Converted to equity 1% 16% 19%
Cash repayment 0% 0% 5%
Haircut 1% 16% 38%
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across in our interviews, relates to the creditors’ flexibility in taking collateral. If a bank 
decides not to increase exposure to a distressed firm due to its risk profile, the door for 
providing additional financing is closed, basically regardless of the loan terms. Bondholders, 
on the other hand, will adjust for the increased risk in the pricing of the bond, typically 
demanding higher coupon rates. Thus, the tendency of issuing secured bonds because of the 
inability to raise bank debt implies that the quality of the collateral would probably be lower. 
Consequently, when restructuring, the recovery rates19 are likely somewhat reduced. However, 
our understanding from interviews is that the main explanation for the difference in recovery 
stems from banks’ relative reluctance to take losses on outstanding debt. This probably also 
relates to bondholders, being a fragmented group of investors, more often having issues with 
aligning interests.  
Table 5.2 provides an illustration of how unsecured bondholders typically end up with 
substantially lower recovery rates than their secured counterparts. Of 15 restructurings where 
the distressed firm had unsecured bond debt, 10 cases involved a reduction in the nominal 
outstanding, with an average of 38%. Moreover, in six of the cases, unsecured debt was 
partially converted to equity. Notably, in contrast to secured claimholders, unsecured 
bondholders are to some extent redeemed in cash. From an unsecured bond investor’s point of 
view, cash redemption represents a safe way of recovering at least some value. Therefore, 
unsecured bondholders might accept a larger haircut on their claim in exchange for increased 
cash redemption. This is consistent with what we see in our sample restructurings, as 5% of 
the pre-restructured unsecured bond debt is redeemed in cash payment to the bondholders 
through buybacks of the outstanding bond.  
As mentioned, there were three cases where secured banks had to convert debt to equity and/or 
take a haircut. However, as the amount of secured debt in the Seabird case was insignificant, 
we will address the other two cases, the Farstad and Havila restructurings. Table 5.3 shows 
the outcome of bond debt given that bank debt is reduced. In both cases, the unsecured lenders 
suffered significant haircuts and no unsecured debt remained. In the Havila case, unsecured 
debt was partially redeemed in cash, while the Farstad case converted debt to equity. This 
lends support to the notion of banks only taking a hit if unsecured debt is lost. Nonetheless, as 
                                                 
19 The recovery rate is the amount of pre-restructured debt recovered after a restructuring. Recovery rate can be computed as 
(1-haircut). 
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the unsecured lenders are compensated, albeit marginally, through cash and equity, they are 
given more than they probably would have received in a liquidation scenario. Moreover, these 
cases inarguably violates the notion of APR.  
 
Table 5.3 – Outcome of bank and bond debts given banks taking a haircut or converting debt to equity 
Some bondholders were rather outspoken in the media during the restructurings of our sample 
firms. Arguably, this can be interpreted as tactics in the run-up to new rounds of negotiations. 
However, it does confirm the notion that some of the unsecured creditors have seen the 
restructuring outcomes as unfair in terms of treatment relative to, for example, banks. The 
abovementioned Havila restructuring stands out in this respect, as it triggered vocal frustration 
amongst a significant share of the secured and unsecured bondholders, who remained 
intransigent throughout the rest of the restructuring process. Thus, the different dynamics 
between banks and bondholders are especially interesting to investigate in this context.20 
Specifically, some of the secured bondholders in Havila were eager to liquidate their collateral, 
whereas the unsecured bond investors were unhappy with the proposed amendments and 
extensions, as well as with Havila and the bank syndicate not involving them earlier in the 
process. The secured bondholders had collateral in Havila’s subsea fleet. Due to a more 
favourable market outlook in the subsea segment and thus increased prospects of cross-
subsidisation21 of the lower performing OSV segments, in which the banks had collateral, the 
secured banks were particularly reluctant to sell off these vessels. Further, in terms of the 
                                                 
20 Our intention is not to describe the Havila case in detail, but to illustrate the changing aspects in the relationship that can 
occur between banks and different stakeholders during a restructuring process. As such, the Havila case functions as a 
backdrop in this regard. A detailed overview of each sample restructuring can be found in Appendix C. 
21 Cross-subsidisation refers to a situation in which profits from one segment are used to pay for another segment that is losing 
money. In particular, cross-subsidisation is relatable to many of the larger ship owners in Norway operating within different 
offshore segments as for instance seismic, subsea, PSV and AHTS. 
Bank debt Unsecured bonds
Farstad Shipping
Remaining debt 87% 0%
Converted to equity 6% 28%
Cash repayment 0% 0%
Haircut 7% 72%
Havila Shipping
Remaining debt 89% 0%
Converted to equity 11% 85%
Cash repayment 0% 15%
Haircut 0% 0%
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unsecured debt, the initial solution proposals required the unsecured bondholders to defer 
amortisation and cut the interest rate from 10% to 1%. Moreover, the suggested maturity 
extension was five years, after the maturity of the secured debt in the company, and a 70% 
haircut on the nominal outstanding. The first solution proposals were both withdrawn as there 
was insufficient support amongst bondholders. Notably, almost a year after the first proposal 
announcements, the restructuring was implemented as the banks managed to force through a 
solution. After a series of unsuccessful attempts, a group of secured banks threatened to 
liquidate the firm if the final proposal was not accepted. As a liquidation scenario would have 
yielded lower recovery than the final proposal, bondholders unwillingly accepted. The terms 
were quite similar to the first proposals, although the haircut on the unsecured debt increased 
from 70% to 85%. Despite acknowledging their lessened seniority, considering the proposals 
only induced secured debt to be extended by two years, as well as accepting some temporary 
amortisation reductions, some unsecured bondholders questioned what, for them, seemed like 
an unproportioned loss.  
There is no obvious answer as to whether the unsecured bondholders have reason to feel poorly 
treated. According to the APR, no unsecured creditor shall have their claim redeemed unless 
more secured creditors have been fully compensated. Given that the secured lenders have 
accepted reduced amortisation and maturity extensions, a 15% recovery rate seems more than 
fair. On the other hand, bondholders, both secured and unsecured, have higher priority than 
equity owners. Thus, a discussion around unfair treatment of bondholders must be seen in light 
of the outcome for equity investors. In the following section, we will highlight the contribution 
of equity investors in our sample restructurings. 
Banks and shareholders 
The relative importance of fresh new equity as opposed to old capital in a restructuring is 
indisputable. Although temporary debt reductions and extended maturities help the distressed 
firms to stay afloat, it is the equity infusion which enables them to move forward. This 
indicates that equity investors who contribute with new capital are more appreciated than 
creditors who are willing to cut the principal by the same amount (Torstensen & Rasmussen, 
2017).  
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Table 5.4 – Magnitude of new equity issued 
Table 5.4 illustrates the magnitude and impact of the new capital coming in through equity 
issues in the restructurings.22 In sum, equity was raised in 16 out of 18 cases. This substantiates 
the notion of creditors only being willing to participate in restructurings if the equity investors 
contribute equally. The equity infusions, when value-weighted, amounted to about 0.86 times 
the market capitalisation prior to the restructuring solution. In terms of dilution effect, on 
average 84% of existing shareholder ownership was diluted by the equity issues included in 
the restructurings, underscoring the depressed nature of the shareholder value prior to the 
restructuring process. Notably, Table 5.4 shows how, on average, the new equity that came in 
only covered 9% of net interest-bearing debt before the restructuring. All else unchanged, the 
equity issues included in the restructurings were clearly insufficient to solve the long-term 
problem of indebtedness. As was the case with the creditors, shareholders have also only been 
willing to commit to short-term solutions and kicked the can while hoping for a speedy market 
recovery. 
Following the discussions of Torstensen and Rasmussen (2017), we can point to three main 
reasons why insufficient equity has ended up being raised in our sample restructurings. Firstly, 
existing owners are not willing to put their money in the creditors’ pockets as long as the 
creditors themselves are unwilling to forego debt. Secondly, if the underlying market 
conditions in the sector still look distressed, the company might experience difficulties raising 
equity from other groups rather than existing owners. As will also be discussed in the next 
chapter, the OSV market experiences a structural mismatch, making new investors reluctant 
to invest in the companies as long as there are no signs of ship owners permanently taking 
vessels out of the market. Finally, the largest existing shareholders will probably be unwilling 
to invite external owners to equity issues for fear of diluting ownership control. Particularly 
                                                 
22 Market capitalisation and NIBD is computed earlier, prior and as close as possible to solution announcement. The dilution 
effect is computed as (1-(pre-restructured number of shares/post-restructured number of shares)). 
Cases with equity issues: 16 Average Max Min
New equity / Market cap 86% 731% 10%
New equity / NIBD 9% 70% 2%
Dilution of existing 
shareholder value
84% 100% 11%
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in the Norwegian offshore industry, the founding families wholly, or at least partially, control 
the ship owners, for instance in Dof (Møgster family), Havila (Sævik), Solstad (Solstad), Siem 
(Siem) and Eidesvik (Eidesvik). These families not only have a unique relationship with 
employees and local communities, but the companies often represent the family legacy. Thus, 
their incentives are clearly skewed towards keeping control over the firm. However, the 
families might not necessarily have unlimited capital to contribute and as such, the equity 
issues end up being insufficient. Nevertheless, it is often in the interest of banks to keep these 
families’ experience and relationships in the company. As such, the banks typically manage 
to obtain a restructuring solution in which these families remain in control of the company, 
often at the expense of creditors and other shareholders. 
 
Table 5.5 - Ownership shares for existing shares, new equity and creditors (% of total # of shares) 
Table 5.5 shows the distribution of existing shares, new equity and shares to creditors post-
restructuring. All of our cases involved issuance of new shares, either through equity issues or 
conversion of debt to equity, or a combination of the two. As previously stated, existing 
shareholders were significantly diluted, and they controlled on average 16% of the shares post-
restructuring. It is noteworthy that in most of the cases, stakeholders of higher seniority 
incurred losses, implying clear violations of the APR.  
The go-to guys 
As the reductions of bank debt are close to negligible, the shareholder value remaining post-
restructuring arguably comes at the expense of the bondholders, not the banks, and the 
unsecured bondholders in particular. Given the seniority and role of banks as key facilitators 
in these processes, we argue that the violations of the APR found in our sample cases represent 
a compensation for the influence shareholders hold over banks pre-restructuring. We find two 
main reasons why the outcomes show a tendency for banks favouring shareholders. Firstly, 
All cases
(Observations: 18)
When new equity
(Observations: 16)
When debt conversion and new equity 
(Observations: 9)
Average Max Min Average Max Min Average Max Min
Existing shares 16% 89% 0% 16% 89% 0% 4% 89% 0%
New equity 51% 95% 0% 55% 95% 1% 42% 95% 0%
Creditors 33% 95% 0% 29% 95% 0% 54% 95% 3%
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the banks do not want to hold company assets or equity. Secondly, the banks see existing 
shareholders as more suitable owners than bondholders. 
Due to both economic and legal reasons, banks shy away from seizing assets. We have 
previously discussed how the deteriorated nature of the markets these assets operate in make 
it difficult to derive value from them. Ironically, in some cases, it seems as if the day a secured 
lender takes possession of its collateral is the day it no longer holds any significant value. 
Accordingly, we find no cases in our sample involving banks taking possession of vessels. In 
the Havila case, the company had to separate the vessels into groups of core and non-core 
vessels, with the company having to sell off vessels from the latter to repay some of the secured 
bank debt. In the restructuring of the formerly listed offshore company Olympic Ships, Nordea 
seized three OSV vessels. Interestingly, Nordea was not able to sell any of the vessels, but 
entered into an agreement with Dof for the management and operation of the vessels, including 
a purchase agreement on 40% of the new build price.  
On the subject of converting debt to equity, banks are generally also reluctant to hold equity. 
In terms of the legal aspects, regulations requires banks to retain significantly more funds as 
equity coverage when holding equity relative to debt. Moreover, considering market 
mechanisms, as the stock market generally does not see banks as long-term investors, the 
expectations of a vast sell-off of shares following the restructuring will cap the share price. 
Although there are several reasons for a limited investor interest for OSV companies, the 
negative share price reaction post-restructuring in both Havila and Farstad supports this 
notion.23 Furthermore, the banks acknowledge that they lack sufficient competencies to 
operate companies. As Thor Haugland, Executive Vice President in the Norwegian savings 
bank SR-Bank, stated after selling their converted shares in Solstad and Havila: “We have no 
interest in retaining ownership in those companies” (Strandli, 2018). 
While banks do not see themselves as fit to be the owners of the post-restructured companies, 
the restructuring outcomes clearly indicate who they believe to be the right ones. In our cases, 
a common denominator is how the banks have actively constructed solutions in which the 
existing largest shareholders have been able to preserve a controlling share of the company. 
                                                 
23 The regional bank SR Bank, which became a major shareholder in both Solstad and Havila post-restructuring, sold its 
converted shares approximately a year after the restructurings with a loss of 35% and 30%, respectively.  
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Examples are the private placements in Rem and Havila, where Åge Remøy and Per Sævik, 
respectively, both kept their 51% ownership, while the remaining existing shareholders were 
significantly diluted. In the former case, the private placement of NOK 150m, which was set 
at a 98% discount to the last traded share price, was exclusively directed towards Remøy. The 
equity issue was later fined by the Oslo Stock Exchange on the grounds of clearly deviating 
from the equal treatment of shareholders principle (Oslo Børs, 2017). Similarly, in the Havila 
case, Per Sævik kept his 51% ownership share, whereas the remaining 49% ownership share 
was diluted to the extent to which it amounted to 2.5% of the post-restructured number of 
shares. Notably, a number of our sample cases24 have involved a private placement in which 
the largest shareholder has pre-subscribed to a number of shares which entitles them to remain 
in control of the company.  
As discussed, the largest shareholders are often families with invaluable experience as ship 
owners, with a great relationship with employees, suppliers and local communities. 
Conversely, bondholders are a fragmented group of investors, often with conflicting interests 
and operating strategies. With regards to value preservation, banks are thus more inclined to 
back the existing shareholders in the restructuring negotiations. In the years preceding the oil 
price collapse, the ship owners had issued significant amounts of bond debt, making bond debt 
a part of the pre-restructured capital structure of all the firms in our sample. In some of our 
cases, due to the extent of bond debt, a full conversion of bond debt to equity would practically 
make the bondholders in control of the firm. As this outcome is considered unattractive to 
banks, it is our understanding that banks, especially in cases where there is limited capital 
available from the existing largest shareholders, choose to construct solutions in which the 
bonds remain unaffected, slightly amended or converted to bonds with new terms. However, 
in terms of the banks’ behaviour towards bondholders, some delicacy is required as 
consistently disproportionate and unfair treatment could frustrate bond investors, effectively 
closing the high-yield bond market for the companies. This could result in hampering the 
firms’ future possibilities of refinancing bank debt.  
In conclusion, banks are unwilling to seize collateral and they also consider themselves unfit 
to control companies. At the same time, they deem the existing shareholders more attractive 
than bondholders in terms of who are more suitable owners post-restructuring. As such, banks 
                                                 
24 For a more detailed overview of our restructurings, we refer to Appendix C. 
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opt to favour outcomes in which the largest shareholders contribute with a significant share of 
the equity. Due to the equal treatment principle of shareholders in equity issues, this has, to 
some extent, also benefitted other shareholders. Bondholders, on the other hand, find 
themselves squeezed between the banks as main creditors and existing shareholders as 
contributors of new equity. Consequently, we find 10 cases where existing shareholders hold 
more than 10% of the post-restructured shares, despite creditors with higher seniority incurring 
losses, thus violating absolute priority. As such, we do have some sympathy for the 
bondholders claiming unfair treatment by banks. However, our compassion only goes so far, 
as bondholders have been left with more than they would have if liquidating the companies. 
As Torstensen and Rasmussen (2018) point out, if you are an unsecured claimholder, it is just 
a question of how much recovery prevents you from pushing the liquidation button.  
What is done and what is next? 
Reading through the solution announcement of every restructuring in our sample, there is a 
consistency in the conveyed intention of each restructuring, namely to enable the companies 
to endure the severe market downturn. Thus, the underlying premises of the restructurings 
were seemingly to provide short-term reliefs rather than to solve the fundamental problems of 
the sector. We will come back to the repercussions of this kick-the-can approach shortly; 
however, let us for a moment take a step back to briefly examine what has been achieved.  
The banks have come out of this round of restructurings practically without a scratch in their 
nominal loan value. Although they have had to defer amortisation and extend maturities, of 
the total outstanding debt pre-restructuring, only 2% was reduced. As far as we understand, 
the banks have managed to preserve the relationship with the companies, as well as with the 
other stakeholders involved in the restructuring process. In terms of the latter, the existing 
owners have been able to maintain a controlling stake in the companies. However, the equity 
issues have cost them greatly and come with significant risk. Further, bondholders have 
suffered severe reductions in debt. In particular, unsecured bondholders have converted debt 
to equity and to some extent been redeemed in cash, often with significant haircuts.  
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Exhibit 5.3 - The average capital structure of our sample firms as of today  
Exhibit 5.3 demonstrates how the restructuring outcomes have entailed severe reductions in 
unsecured debt. Today, the average sample firm’s capital structure consists of 8% unsecured 
debt, from 21% going into the restructurings. Notably, the unsecured bond debt is measured 
at face value. However, as these bonds are listed, we are able to observe that the fair value of 
this debt is effectively much lower. For example, Solstad’s unsecured bond SOFF04, with an 
outstanding nominal of NOK 1 billion, trades at above 90% discount to face value per 
November 2019. This indicates that the recovery in any potential new restructuring would be 
limited. Moreover, it implies that banks are considerably more exposed to losses if debt 
reductions are necessary in a potential second wave of restructurings.  
In terms of the distressed companies, they all avoided liquidation. Importantly, the 
restructurings have so far enabled them to continue serving their customers and preserve the 
backlogs. Moreover, firms have generally been able to avoid cancellations of newbuilds, 
typically through postponements of the delivery date. Nonetheless, the employees have 
experienced significant downsizing due to the deteriorated nature of the industry and the 
distressed position of the companies. Although structural restructurings go beyond the scope 
of this thesis, we note that some of our sample firms have implemented actions to alter their 
operational course, as well as changing their financial structure. 
Exhibit 5.4 illustrates the development in the average (book) debt-to-equity (D/E) ratio of the 
sample firms prior to the restructurings up until today25, including a particular emphasis on 
the effect from the restructurings we have investigated. The reductions in bond debt combined 
                                                 
25 Today refers in both Exhibit 5.3 and Exhibit 5.4 to 19.11.2019. 
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with significant equity infusion had an immediate effect, cutting the D/E ratio by a third to 
2.18.  
Exhibit 5.4 - Restructuring effect on D/E-ratio and change in D/E-ratio post-restructuring 
Exhibit 5.4 also provides insight to the current situation of our sample firms. Although cases 
like Solstad and Havila somewhat confuse the overall picture, there is inarguably an issue of 
the offshore companies still struggling under heavy indebtedness as the current D/E ratio 
equals 7.40. Moreover, the average cash flow-to-debt ratio in our sample is 4%. As the equity 
infusions from previous restructurings are long gone, the debt remains record high, and the 
operational landscape remains depressed and barely at cash break-even levels, more than a 
handful of our sample firms have communicated to the market that negotiations with creditors 
once again are ongoing. 
Regretfully, one of the most important things to take from our restructurings, is that they do 
not address the issue of overcapacity in the OSV industry. As the oversupply of vessels was 
one of the key contributing factors for the downturn, this substantiates our notion that 
stakeholders preferred kicking the can a few years down the road rather than taking the bull 
by the horns and addressing the elephant in the room. Being the main creditor across 
companies in the same sector, banks are in pole position to dictate an industry-wide collective 
effort to reduce the capacity in the market, improving the market balance and paving the way 
for a financially sustainable future. However, as this potentially would incur significant losses, 
banks have been exceptionally reluctant to let go of their collateral. Nevertheless, it is our clear 
understanding that in the issue of overcapacity lies the key to a market improvement. We have 
difficulties seeing any market movement that would be able to absorb the extensive number 
of vessels laid up along the west coast of Norway.  
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In the section explaining financial restructurings, we emphasised that if the company’s 
financial distress is due to cyclical downturns that are expected to pass, creditors are probably 
not incentivised to forego significant portions of their claim. However, if the downturn turns 
out to be lasting, an inadequate initial restructuring would probably be succeeded by new 
rounds of restructurings. The similarities to our sample restructurings are striking. Arguably, 
the downturn in the OSV industry is just as much a structural crisis as it is a cyclical downturn. 
The hopes of a swift market recovery are futile as long as the supply-demand balance remains 
fundamentally skewed. Given this, the banks would have needed to initiate measures in excess 
of solely easing the short-term liquidity squeeze. Knowingly or unknowingly, the banks 
misdiagnosed the industry, and as a result prescribed the wrong medicine. Clearly, the 
restructurings provided some short-term relief; however, substantiated by Exhibit 5.4, they 
certainly did not cure our firms.  
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6. Outlook for bank behaviour in coming restructurings  
Having considered the restructurings that are behind us, we now turn our attention to the 
current status of our sample firms. Despite increasing E&P spending encouraging offshore 
activity, the OSV industry still battles depressed day rates due to an overwhelming oversupply 
of vessels. The issue of capacity surplus has been labelled a key contributing factor for the 
depressed state of the market. However, none of our sample cases addressed this in the last 
restructuring round. Our opinion is that future restructurings must confront the excess of 
vessels in the market. In the next sections, we will discuss this issue in more detail. 
Initially, we will give a brief overview of the current OSV market, with a particular emphasis 
on the market balance and how our sample firms fit into this picture. The first section “A 
drastic remedy is needed” refers to the market being conceived as oversupplied. Then, we turn 
to the role of banks in terms initiating an industry-wide scrapping effort. The section 
“Desperate sellers, broke buyers” deals with the depressed level of vessel values, to which 
most bank debt is tied. Further, the section “Stronger together?” addresses the potential role 
of consolidations in future restructurings in order to improve the market balance. Lastly, the 
section “Temporary solutions to permanent problems” describes how we believe in the 
companies and their claimholders’ ability to find new restructuring solutions. However, we 
are cautious about concluding the extent to which these solutions will be permanent. 
A drastic remedy is needed 
The immensely profitable prospects in the early years of the 2010s persuaded ship owners to 
plough all profits back into newbuilds. Inevitably, the reinvestments led to overinvestments. 
Per Sævik, majority owner of Havila, has termed the rapid growth in the OSV fleet in the mid-
2010s as a collective suicide amongst ship owners (Sævik, 2017). He argues that regardless of 
the oil price collapse, due to the unsustainable number of operating vessels, the OSV 
companies at some point were doomed to collapse.26 
                                                 
26 The OSV industry is indeed global. However, the entry between the regions is low. Moreover, our sample firms and their 
banks are particularly exposed to the situation in the North Sea. Thus, we will focus on this particular fleet in the following. 
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The current North Sea fleet of OSVs totals around 375 vessels. Our clear impression after 
interviews with stakeholders across the industry is that significant reductions to this number 
are needed. In an attempt to quantify a sustainable OSV market equilibrium, we argue that an 
OSV/Rig-ratio could provide some clarity,27 as the number of operating offshore rigs still 
remains the primary OSV market driver. The OSV/Rig-ratio indicates the number of available 
OSVs in the market relative to operative rigs. For instance, if there are 350 OSVs in the market, 
available to serve 35 rigs operating in the North Sea, the OSV/Rig-ratio equals 10 times.  
We acknowledge that there is no clear-cut answer to what is a sustainable number of vessels. 
Tidewater, the largest OSV operator globally, has previously argued that an OSV market 
equilibrium corresponds to an OSV/Rig-ratio around 5 times, regardless of operating region 
(Rynd, 2018). Given a medium-term outlook of around 5028 working rigs in the North Sea, a 
reasonable number of vessels serving these rigs should be around 250. Notably, with 375 
OSVs currently available in the market, an equilibrium is considerably distant from this 
scenario. This substantiates our claim that a significant reduction, possibly as much as one 
third of the current fleet, is pivotal for the market to recover.  
As such, a healthier market balance is dependent on capacity reductions. However, 
determining which ships to scrap is not straightforward. Generally, there are two main factors 
indicating whether a laid-up ship is likely to ever come back into operation (Gjønnes & 
Ringholm, 2017). Firstly, the age of the vessel is critical, as recommissioning of old and idle 
ships is considerably expensive. Consensus amongst industry experts and analysts in today’s 
market, is that a vessel which is older than 15 years, and also has been stacked for more than 
two years, will most likely never come back into operation. Secondly, the ownership status of 
the vessel gives an indication of the willingness and capability of getting the vessel into the 
market. In terms of willingness, the vessels of our sample firms are largely financed with bank 
debt. Consequently, any impairment or scrapping would directly impact on the banks having 
collateral in these ships. Moreover, reactivation of laid-up ships requires cash up front, 
whereas the contracts paid to the operators is settled later. Thus, the firm will need to build up 
                                                 
27 We acknowledge that such ratios disregard important distinctions in terms of size, specifications and services provided by 
the different vessels. However, for simplicity, we argue that using OSV/working rigs sufficiently justifies the mean. 
28 A consensus outlook of global E&P activity has suggested 500-550 working rigs over the next five years. Our estimation 
of North Sea-activity corresponding to 10% of this number of rigs is based on conversations with our interviewees.  
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working capital which requires funding not necessarily available. Further, we assume that 
there are banks involved who would suggest such money to be spent for repayment purposes 
rather than to revive old ships. Regarding the ability to get the vessels back in the market, there 
is inarguably a significant difference between a ship owned by, for instance, an Asian bank 
which has reclaimed its collateral and a Norwegian ship owner in terms of who has the 
experience and industrial knowledge to take a vessel back into operation. 
Table 6.1 provides a brief overview of the OSV fleet in our sample. Overall, our firms have 
218 vessels in their respective fleets, 57 of which are laid up. Solstad represents the 
overwhelming majority of the idle capacity, having 48 vessels stacked in total, where 18 were 
built prior to 2004. Similarly, two of the three vessels Dof has laid up are more than 15 years 
old. In addition, Havila and Siem have four and three OSVs stacked, respectively. All of these 
are less than 15 years old. Eidesvik and Oceanteam currently have all of their vessels on 
contract. 
 
Table 6.1 – The number of OSVs (excl. seismic and subsea) in our sample, incl. lay-up status 
Isolating the proposed age-indicator of which vessels will probably never re-enter the global 
OSV market; a back-of-the-envelope calculation based on Table 6.1 implies that 16 vessels in 
our sample are good candidates for scrapping, namely the two and 14 vessels owned by Dof 
and Solstad, respectively. Further, we note that there are 28 additional vessels which have been 
in lay-up for more than two years, 22 of which are older than 10 years. Thus, given the 
costliness of recommissioning and the low day-rates on any potential contract, these are 
possible candidates for scrapping as well.  
We believe that the abovementioned companies, given that it is a part of a collective effort 
throughout the industry, would prefer to scrap vessels. As long as there is an excess of vessels 
bidding for contracts, the achievable day-rates for the distressed companies will remain 
depressed. However, there are banks having collateral in these ships, and as far as we 
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understand, no bank would ever allow a company to scrap a vessel to which it has considerable 
outstanding debt tied, particularly not unilaterally. In the following sections, we make two 
assumptions for the behaviour of banks in terms of scrapping vessels in future restructurings. 
Firstly, the banks are obviously reluctant to let go of their collateral, and even more so if their 
collateral values are significantly higher than the scrapping value. Secondly, an industry-wide 
scrapping effort would only be achievable through consolidation of companies and/or a system 
of compensation amongst creditors. The former assumption will be dealt with first, while the 
latter will be addressed subsequently.  
Desperate sellers, broke buyers 
We assume that lower collateral values increase the likelihood that banks will be willing to 
scrap a vessel. Relative to this assumption, we have observed two common rules in the 
industry. The first relates to the firms’ financing of the ships. The second deals with the issue 
of valuing assets in a depressed market. Both rules paint a rather grim picture of the situation 
for banks holding collateral in distressed assets. 
Prior to the industry downturn, a general rule for ship owners acquiring vessels was to finance 
with 80% debt. For Norwegian firms, the main source of debt was banks, resulting in some of 
the larger Norwegian banks being severely exposed to the offshore industry. In Q1 2016, the 
banks’ total exposure to the OSV industry amounted to around NOK 65 billion (Finanstilsynet, 
2017). However, the value of vessels rapidly diminishes when the market turns sour. The other 
common industry rule is that the value of marine steel, being both rigs and ships, plunges by 
as much as 80% in a depressed market. Obviously, there are no rules without exceptions, and 
some vessels have distinct attributes and characteristics differentiating them in the event of an 
upswing. Nonetheless, this rule has historically been confirmed on several occasions, for 
example during the shipping crisis in the late-1970s and in 2011. Moreover, second-hand 
prices of OSVs observed in the last few years further lend support to the rule. For instance, 
the Norwegian offshore company Standard Drilling, which has spent the downturn acquiring 
ships at depressed prices, has recently acquired a five-year-old Norwegian-built PSV from a 
liquidated firm for a price of $8.1 million, representing a discount of 82% on a $44 million 
estimated newbuild price (S.D. Standard Drilling Plc, 2019). Given that this vessel was 
operative in the North Sea prior to the liquidation of its owner, this would imply that the cold-
stacked OSVs are worth even less. Consequently, these two 80% rules imply that banks, by 
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being pro-cyclical during the boom, have accumulated extensive amounts of debt tied to ships 
which are worth dramatically less now that the market is bust.  
When confronted with these rules, the banks are consistently dismissing their relevance and 
validity. We, however, still find them very interesting, as we assess that the probability of 
banks agreeing to scrap vessels in future restructurings is directly linked to the extent to which 
banks have outstanding debt tied to these ships. Understandably, any bank would be reluctant 
to waive its collateral in an operative $50 million supply vessel. However, such a vessel would 
never be scrapped. On the other hand, the numerous cold-stacked vessels, especially the ones 
identified in the section above, have significantly depreciated values. Reactivating these 
vessels would induce significant costs, and would only happen if a profitable long-term 
contract presented itself. We note that such contracts are rare events in the current market. 
Thus, in terms of these cold-stacked vessels, given that the physical steel value is negligible, 
banks are only left with an option on a recovering market. Our understanding is that no market 
recovery will be able to absorb the current number of vessels in the market. Hence, we would 
argue that banks this time are probably better off with solutions which include scrapping of 
such vessels. Firstly, a slimmer supply side would provide the companies with bargaining 
power to achieve day-rates covering financial costs, as well as operating costs, the former of 
which, is not the case today, and would clearly benefit banks if this were to change. Moreover, 
we find it almost inevitable that the current companies’ debt overhang may cause problems in 
the future with respect to fleet renewal. This will put our sample firms at a disadvantage 
compared to financially healthy operators, as, for example, the aforementioned Standard 
Drilling, which has 100% equity financing of its ships (Dixon, 2017).  
Our notion that banks are more likely to accept losses on vessels with deteriorated values 
builds upon the assumption that banks have reduced their collateral values as the vessels’ 
market values have diminished, making it easier to forego the relatively little remaining debt 
in the next round of restructurings. However, this assumption is likely not to hold. In late 2017, 
the Norwegian Financial Supervisory Authority examined the extent to which the five largest 
Norwegian banks have booked impairments on outstanding offshore debt, given the market 
development and the restructurings already undertaken. The banks had made impairments of 
NOK 6 billion in total, through provisions and realized losses (Finanstilsynet, 2017). 
Investigating the banks’ 2018 annual reports, we find no considerable write-downs, with some 
banks even reversing impairments. Thus, we believe an estimate of NOK 6-7 billion provides 
a sufficient overall image for the period of 2015-2019. Table 6.2 shows the impairments made 
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by our sample firms in the supply and anchor-handling segments alone. Interestingly, 
accumulated impairments add up to NOK 24 billion, almost four times the total amount 
booked by banks.  
 
Table 6.2 – Impairments on OSV values, 2015-Q3 2019 
*Solstad includes impairments from Rem, Deep Sea and Farstad prior to the merger 
As we mentioned in the section on banking regulations, banks are allowed to use their own 
internal ratings-based models when computing risk-weighted assets. These models are not 
publicly disclosed, which makes it significantly more difficult to trace losses on individual 
companies, or to examine the rationale behind the reported provisions and realised losses. 
However, given the anticipated impact of IFRS 9 on banks’ assessment of expected credit 
losses, we find the lack of reported losses and impairments baffling. Prior to the 
implementation of IFRS 9, the general opinion in the market was that impairments would 
increase significantly with the new accounting standards, as losses would be assessed through 
scenario-weighted expectations of debt recovery rather than losses being realised only when 
incurred by specific trigger events (Trumpy, 2017). Two years into IFRS 9 reporting, our 
impression is that banks are not even close to booking sufficient impairments, by placing too 
much emphasis on scenarios reflecting market recovery rather than scenarios assuming the 
market to remain depressed. Moreover, calculations of expected credit loss are supposed to 
include reasonable assumptions of the current market situation and outlook, usually by 
shipbrokers giving their estimates and projections. As far as we understand from banks’ 
financial reports, there is still substantial dissonance between the booked values related to 
outstanding collateral and the actual value of the vessels observed in the market. Due to few 
transactions in distressed markets, banks are allowed to rely on the shipbroker’s assumption 
of “willing seller, willing buyer” when valuing vessels. It is worth noting that even though the 
DOF Eidesvik Offshore Havila Shipping Oceanteam Siem Offshore Solstad Offshore*
2015 500 290 1 388 145 1 466 3 292
2016 1 762 509 901 189 553 3 878
2017 1 146 203 0 247 1 026 395
2018 691 0 709 0 551 896
2019 917 0 0 0 0 2 250
In total 5 016 1 002 2 289 581 3 596 10 711
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same brokers have publicly described the current market as “desperate sellers, broke buyers” 
(Flaaten, 2018), these seemingly inflated values are allowed to stay in the banks’ financial 
statements.  
Thus, as long as the auditors and the Norwegian FSA approve the stated values, in terms of 
preserving value for their shareholders, we find no incentives for banks to write down the 
values of old and idle vessels. Nevertheless, considering our notion that banks should be able 
to forego debt more easily in future restructurings, as the losses are already behind them, 
regrettably we find no basis for this. This conflicts with our theory that the deteriorated values 
of the vessels could open up for banks to include an industry-wide condemnation as a part of 
upcoming restructuring solutions.  
Stronger together? 
When asked to describe its behaviour in the last round of restructurings, one of the banks we 
interviewed emphasised how they had acted with discipline. In order to construct sustainable 
restructuring solutions in the future, we hope that discipline is not confused with pride. 
Although we understand the banks’ reluctance to forego collateral, it seems inevitable that 
banks must accept to scrap vessels in order to facilitate an OSV industry recovery. Our second 
assumption in terms of bank behaviour towards scrapping vessels, is that such an effort is 
dependent on banks being able to facilitate this across all companies in the industry. One way 
of steering the restructuring solutions in this direction is by pushing for more consolidation. 
Added to the possibilities of monetising on synergy effects from improved market entry, cost 
efficiency and better capital market access, we argue that larger units through consolidation 
will find it easier to scrap vessels as the effect on the balance sheet and their operations will 
be more limited.  
In our sample, the Solstad merger stands out as the only example of restructuring through 
consolidation. The merger was described by the banks as a necessary structural measure 
enabling the merged company to achieve synergies through more efficient operations and a 
lower cost base. Through the Aker system and John Fredriksen’s Hemen Holding,29 the banks 
found a solution which included both industrial expertise and financial muscles for the 
                                                 
29 John Fredriksen's investment holding Hemen Holding was the controlling owner of Deep Sea Supply prior to the merger. 
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company to withstand the demanding market. Nonetheless, the merger did not address the 
issue of overcapacity. Particularly Deep Sea Supply brought vessels into the merged company, 
mainly built by Indian and Chinese yards, which clearly did not complement the rest of the 
fleet as they were inadequate for most North Sea operations. As an illustration, eight Deep Sea 
Supply PSVs, all of which were Indian from 2007 or 2008, have been cold-stacked since the 
merger. Although we understand the attractiveness of teaming up with financial heavyweights 
such as Fredriksen in a consolidation, we find the inclusion of indebted vessels with no 
expected cash-flow outlook as not constructive. As long as these redundant vessels are present 
in the market, albeit cold-stacked, they will function as anchors for contract rates and ship 
values.  
Consolidation is an efficient method for banks to collectively reduce debt throughout an 
industry at the same time as concentrating and preserving valuable expertise and to enable cost 
synergies in the firms. However, it is also an opportunity to facilitate scrapping of vessels. 
Learning from the Solstad merger, we argue that the banks did not arrange for a successful 
merger. Notably, the merger triggered close to NOK 1 billion in cost savings on both 
operational and administrative levels. Nevertheless, although involving a slight 7% haircut on 
bank debt in the Farstad case, the vast majority of pre-merger bank debt was simply amended 
and extended. As an illustration, the net interest-bearing debt-to-market capitalisation ratio in 
the post-restructured company was 15, by far the highest amongst our sample firms. Moreover, 
the combined fleet of around 140 vessels is clearly too large, and it stands as proof of the 
unwillingness amongst creditors to deal with the pressing issue of overcapacity. It should be 
noted that 38 vessels have been in lay-up since the merger. To our knowledge, none have been 
scrapped. In contrast, Tidewater has scrapped 85 ships in the last few years (Snyder, 2019). 
Interestingly, contrary to our sample cases, Tidewater’s restructuring in 2017 ended up with 
all creditors converting their outstanding debt to equity. Hence, the company came out of the 
process practically debt-free and has been able to scrap redundant vessels without the 
creditors’ blessing. 
We argue that in order to derive value from coming restructurings, future solution proposals 
have to include scrapping of vessels in combination with equity infusions and substantial debt 
reductions. Merging companies would be a rational way of addressing all of these issues. As 
emphasised, any debt reduction must be collectively distributed across the companies to have 
the anticipated impact. If not, the company with reduced indebtedness will be able to undercut 
every firm with an unchanged burden of debt. Consolidation would address this issue as it 
 65 
creates fewer and financially stronger market players, potentially enabling the banks to reduce 
the level of debt with less than they would if the firms remained as separate units. Regarding 
the scrapping, banks, by being universal creditors, are the only claimholders effectively having 
the power to enforce restrictions on fleet size throughout the whole industry. An industry-wide 
scrapping must be founded upon an evaluation based on age and efficiency of the vessels, 
across companies. Moreover, as the banks are basically all exposed to the same companies 
and fleets, they have to work together towards a compensation system for the vessels that end 
up being scrapped. Arguably, finding reasonable solutions to these challenges would be less 
demanding if the firms were consolidated into larger companies. Further, raising equity would 
probably also be easier if there are larger units.  
In conclusion, we believe that a bank-initiated scrapping effort is more likely to be achieved 
through industry consolidation and a compensation system for the vessels that are scrapped. 
This requires extensive efforts throughout the banking syndicate. Given the insight from our 
interviewees, that aligning interest between banks is one of the most time-consuming aspects 
of a restructuring, we acknowledge that this might prove difficult in the short term. 
Temporary solutions to permanent problems 
Predicting the outcomes of future restructuring rounds is a matter of balancing the confidence 
in banks having intentions of improving the offshore industry with the awareness that old 
customs die hard. From interviews, our impression is that as long as equity investors are 
willing to contribute with cash, banks will continue using temporary solutions such as 
amortisation deferrals and maturity extensions, essentially turning back to old and well-known 
tricks. We have already highlighted how the last round of restructuring solutions, by not 
addressing the problems of either indebtedness or overcapacity, effectively just kicked the can 
down the road. As the market will not recover unless the issues of debt and oversupply are 
solved, that road inevitably seems more and more like a dead end.  
Arguably, both banks and shareholders must increase their contributions in order to construct 
sustainable capital structures following the next round. As the presence of unsecured bond 
debt is limited, banks should see more of their debt being converted, and even to some extent 
reduced. We have argued in favour of measures dealing directly with the issues of overcapacity 
and the need for a more consolidated industry. However, as it stands, the incentives for banks 
to address these issues still seem too small. 
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In the first round of restructurings, the main contributors of new equity were the largest 
existing owners. The vast majority of the cases involved equity infusions that turned out to be 
extremely costly for the owners, and came in addition to the severe value loss related to the 
market downturn. Certainly, this raises the question of whether they can afford additional 
contributions. If not, this would bring new dynamics to the restructuring processes and could 
open up opportunities for more consolidation in the industry. In order to find new equity 
outside the OSV industry, banks have to give considerably beneficial terms to attract sufficient 
interest. This could entail debt reductions. As banks communicate a continuous intention to 
reduce their offshore exposure, we believe options like issuing new loans and taking over 
ownership are less plausible. 
In their conclusion, Torstensen and Rasmussen (2017) questioned the long-term impact of the 
restructuring solutions, as the debt levels remained high and the restructurings included few 
consolidations and new owners. Unless the market did not rapidly recover, a new wave of 
restructurings could potentially wash over the Norwegian ship owners. A second round might 
include increased consolidation, losses for banks, and forced liquidation, they argued.  
In the two years that have passed, the market has not remotely recovered as expected. As a 
result, the industry has seen seven new restructurings. Further, the maturity extensions in 
several other cases are soon caught up with, including the Dof, Havila and Solstad cases which 
all have entered into new restructuring negotiations with the creditors, the latter two with 
considerably negative book value of equity. However, we are sceptical of the probability of 
forced liquidation. Unless the vessels are sold to firms operating outside the industry, the 
market imbalance will continue. Obviously, not all PSVs can be transformed into well boats 
in the aquaculture industry or rescue ships in the Mediterranean. As such, we mostly consider 
forced liquidation of vessels to be another short-term solution. 
In terms of the prospects for increased consolidation and bank losses, our findings are rather 
similar to those of Torstensen and Rasmussen (2017). As the net effects on the banks’ debt 
claims were negligible in most of our cases in the first round of restructurings, there are now 
clear indications that banks have to contribute more going into round two, either through 
conversion of debt to equity or haircuts on the nominal. The anticipated market upswing 
depends on a fundamentally healthier market balance, and it is, in our view, critical that banks 
opt for solutions that include both enhanced industry consolidation and scrapping of vessels. 
Following new accounting standards, we assumed that significantly reduced market values on 
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the collateral would trigger the relative attractiveness of scrapping vessels. However, the 
implementation of IFRS 9 has not led to banks taking what we consider to be proportionate 
impairments. Thus, as long as the FSA and auditors do not put pressure on banks to report 
more losses on the outstanding engagements, our understanding is that the banks’ incentives 
to amend and extend existing loan terms outweigh those pushing for scrapping of vessels and 
industry consolidation.  
The indications we have seen from the restructuring cases after Torstensen and Rasmussen 
(2017) lend support to our impression that banks will continue kicking the can as long as there 
are equity investors willing to contribute. We have not observed any willingness amongst 
creditors to address the need for enhanced industry consolidation or a compensation scheme 
for those forgiving collateral. As such, we find it reasonable to assume that it will take time 
before any such arrangements could be deemed realistic. Consequently, for the upcoming 
round of restructurings, we fear the probability of yet another series of temporary solutions to 
permanent problems. 
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7. Limitations and areas of further research 
Although it is tempting to say that our discussions about the role of banks in our sample cases 
will set a precedence for future Norwegian financial restructurings, we acknowledge that there 
are some limitations to our thesis. In this chapter, we highlight some main underlying 
assumptions, their implications and how similar analyses could be developed in further 
research. 
First of all, our sample includes only 18 observations. The lack of observations has reduced 
the possibility of using more advanced statistical analyses. As such, we acknowledge that 
adding companies from other offshore-related industries to our sample, such as E&P, oil-
service and drilling, would have increased the number of observations. However, we believe 
this would have weakened the precision and relevance of our discussions in terms of the 
interactions between stakeholders within one industry. Further, extending the time horizon 
back in time would also have added more financial restructurings to our sample. This would 
consequently have triggered a different context to our thesis. In addition, going back in time 
to crises with similar underlying characteristics, for instance the shipping crisis in the 1970s, 
would suggest significant difficulties collecting information. Moreover, as the high-yield 
market has not been prominent in Norway before this century, observations prior to the 2000s 
would not include the same dynamics between private and disbursed debt. 
Our sample firms operate in cyclical and asset-heavy industries, two factors which both have 
implications for the outcomes of the restructuring. In terms of cyclicality, we argue that the 
claimholders probably would have been more reluctant to extend and amend if they did not 
assume that the company’s financial distress was primarily due to cyclical downturns, and that 
the market would recover in a few years. As discussed, the notion of asset liquidity plays a 
critical role in the outcomes of restructurings. Thus, regarding the asset-heavy nature of our 
sample firms’ industry, one should be cautious of generalising the outcomes of our 
restructurings to other industries where the distressed firms’ assets are more liquid. 
Further, as our sample includes only Norwegian restructurings, we stress that judicial 
differences and legislative proceedings concerning bankruptcy differ between countries. 
Therefore, the results of the restructurings might not generalise to other countries. However, 
we argue that such differences and conflicting outcomes of workouts between countries could 
be a topic for further research. Moreover, the capital structures tend to differ between 
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countries. The financing scheme of Norwegian firms relative to for example US companies, 
differs significantly on the share of private versus disbursed debt. Consequently, we have few 
or no examples where secured bond debt is outweighing bank debt. As Norwegian banks are 
significantly reducing their exposure in the offshore segments, bond financing will inevitably 
be a relatively more important part of the ship owners’ capital structure. Thus, an area of 
further research could be the question of future capital structures and project financing in the 
industry. Moreover, the ownership structure in Norwegian offshore firms is distinctly different 
from other countries. Our sample firms are largely companies where the founding families are 
still majority owners. As discussed, this impacts on the incentives and contributions of such 
equity investors. In addition, they possess knowledge and expertise which have made them 
subject to favourable treatment by banks in the negotiations. 
We have restricted our sample to only include listed companies, and have also excluded 
companies that were listed prior to the restructuring but later delisted. This is due to the lack 
of information, as well as to be able to compare the current situation of our firms. However, 
this may impact upon the findings in our thesis, and potentially their relevance. Firstly, private 
firms will typically have problems in relation to information asymmetries. This would have 
an impact on the negotiation dynamics as claimholders outside the company are likely to have 
limited access to important information about the firms’ financial and operational status. 
Secondly, the fact that shares are more illiquid in private companies, implies that conversion 
of debt to equity is relatively unattractive compared to restructurings in listed companies. 
Moreover, by excluding delisted companies, we only include companies which we know 
survived the restructuring processes. This creates a survivorship bias which could give the 
impression that all private workouts will end successfully. It is worth noting that the seismic 
company Dolphin Geophysical and the ship owner Atlantic Offshore declared bankruptcy 
after unsuccessful out-of-court negotiations. Finally, although the shares were not listed on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange, several companies have their bonds listed on the Nordic ABM, thus 
raises Norwegian capital in the same way as other listed Norwegian firms. By not including 
such companies, for instance Viking Supply Ships, Island Offshore and Boa Offshore, we have 
excluded observations potentially altering or impacting on our findings. 
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8. Conclusion 
This thesis has provided insight into the role of banks in the financial restructurings in the 
Norwegian offshore industry after the oil price collapse in 2014 given the persistent depressed 
situation in the OSV market. Through analysing the restructuring outcomes, as well as the 
negotiation dynamics between banks and other stakeholders, we have showed how unsecured 
bondholders and equity owners have succeeded in preserving values to which they would not 
have been entitled in a liquidation scenario. Our results thus confirm the notion of frequent 
violations of APR in out-of-court restructurings, consistent with the findings of Gilson et al. 
(1990) and Frank and Torous (1994). Having discussed the position of banks as universal 
creditors, and its relevance in addressing the issue of market oversupply in future 
restructurings, we find that solutions involving scrapping of vessels and industry consolidation 
are crucial in order to help companies break out of the restructuring spiral. 
Following a theoretical backdrop explaining the concept of financial restructurings, the thesis 
started by assessing qualitative aspects of the determinants of bank behaviour in a restructuring 
process. Our model point to four main aspects forming bank behaviour, being the current 
financial status of the distressed firm, the targeted capital structure post-restructuring, the 
banks’ judicial and regulatory constraints and the relationship with the other stakeholders. 
Analysing the banks’ contributions in the restructuring outcomes, we observe that bank debt 
post-restructuring is practically unchanged from the level prior to the restructurings. Instead 
of nominal reductions, the banks have opted to amend and extend current loan terms. In terms 
of interaction with other claimholders, equity has mainly been issued through private 
placements from the largest existing owners. As such, banks have violated the APR by 
favouring shareholders at the expense of more senior creditors.  
We believe that the downturn in the OSV industry is just as much a structural crisis as it is a 
cyclical downturn. As such, it is essential that the outcomes of upcoming restructurings include 
banks initiating and supporting an industry-wide scrapping of vessels and enhanced 
consolidation in order to improve the market balance. However, in the years since Torstensen 
and Rasmussen’s thesis (2017), our opinion is that banks have proved themselves neither 
prepared nor willing to address these fundamental issues burdening the industry. Thus, in 
terms of bank behaviour in coming restructurings, we think future solutions will continue to 
provide short-term relief while the more permanent issues will remain unsolved.   
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Appendix 
The appendices offer complements to the results presented in the thesis. Initially, we explain 
the calculations of the Altman’s Z-score. Thereafter, as the majority of our results are 
presented on an aggregated level, we provide nuances at the level of the individual companies. 
First, by providing company specific data which was basis for tables presented in this thesis, 
and then a one-pager summary of each individual restructuring solution. 
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Appendix A – Altman’s Z-score 
Altman Z score is a statistical tool used to assess the likelihood for a company to go bankrupt 
based on its financial position. The score is a predication of five financial ratios; profitability, 
leverage, liquidity, solvency and activity. The coefficients are set according to the prediction 
power with respect to bankruptcy.  
 
where,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Companies with Z-score above 3.0 have low likelihood of bankruptcy. On the other hand, a 
Z-score below 1.8 means that the company has a very high probability of declaring 
bankruptcy. 
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Appendix B – Tables on firm level 
Table A.1 – Company names and tickers 
 
Table A.2 – Outcome for secured bond debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HAVI PLCS PLCS3 SBX SBX2
Cash redemption 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Haircut 0% 14% 0% 53% 0%
Conversion to equity 0% 6% 0% 27% 82%
Total debt reduction 0% 20% 0% 80% 82%
Maturity extension
(years)
3.6 4.0 0.3 2.0 3.0
Company Ticker
DOF ASA DOF
Eidesvik Offshore EIOF
Electromagnetic Geoservices EMGS
Farstad Shipping FAR
Havila Shipping HAVI
Oceanteam OTS
Polarcus PLCS
Rem Offshore REM
Seabird Exploration SBX
Siem Offshore SIOFF
Solstad Offshore SOFF
 78
Table A.3 – Outcome for bank debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOF EIOF EMGS EMGS2 EMGS3 FAR
Cash redemption 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Haircut 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7%
Conversion to equity 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5%
Reduced amortization
(% of outstanding) 7% 9% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total debt reduction 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13%
Maturity extension
(years)
0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0
HAVI OTS PLCS PLCS2 PLCS3 REM
Cash redemption 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Haircut 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Conversion to equity 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Reduced amortization
(% of outstanding) 25% 0% 24% 12% 32% 34%
Total debt reduction 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Maturity extension
(years)
4.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 3.5
SBX SBX2 SBX3 SIOFF SIOFF2 SOFF
Cash redemption 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Haircut 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Conversion to equity 0% 83% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Reduced amortization
(% of outstanding) 0% 0% 0% 0% 30% 0%
Total debt reduction 0% 83% 0% 0% 0% 0 %
Maturity extension
(years)
0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.0 2.2
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Table A.4 – Outcome for unsecured bond debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOF EIOF EMGS EMGS2 EMGS3 FAR
Cash redemption 10% 60% 18% 6% 0% 0%
Haircut 50% 40% 5% 3% 0% 72%
Conversion to equity 40% 0% 0% 0% 0% 28%
Total debt reduction 100% 100% 23% 9% 0% 100%
Maturity extension
(years)
0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
HAVI OTS PLCS PLCS2 PLCS3 REM
Cash redemption 15% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8%
Haircut 85% 0% 45% 0% 70% 50%
Conversion to equity 0% 100% 32% 0% 16% 15%
Total debt reduction 100% 100% 78% 0% 86% 73%
Maturity extension
(years)
3.6 0.0 4.2 0.0 2.6 5.3
SBX SBX2 SBX3 SIOFF SIOFF2 SOFF
Cash redemption 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Haircut 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0%
Conversion to equity 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total debt reduction 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 
Maturity extension
(years)
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.5 2.3
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Table A.5 – Equity contribution in numbers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOF EIOF EMGS EMGS2 EMGS3 FAR
New equity / Market cap 381% 23% 241% 98% 39% 395%
New equity / NIBD 9% 7% - - 70% 6%
New equity / Total liabilities 7% 6% 36% 27% 16% 5%
New equity / Equity asked for
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Private placement / New equity 41% 80% 50% 19% 0% 95%
HAVI OTS PLCS PLCS2 PLCS3 REM
New equity / Market cap 405% - - 173% 245% 181%
New equity / NIBD 4% - - 15% 23% 4%
New equity / Total liabilities 3% - - 10% 17% 3%
New equity / Equity asked for
100% - - 90% 100% 89%
Private placement / New equity 85% - - 100% 64% 100%
SBX SBX2 SBX3 SIOFF SIOFF2 SOFF
New equity / Market cap 275% 731% 89% 109% 10% 60%
New equity / NIBD 13% 58% - 9% 2% 3%
New equity / Total liabilities 7% 25% - 7% 1% 3%
New equity / Equity asked for
97% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Private placement / New equity 100% 95% 90% 52% 83% 88%
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Table A.6 – Financial and operational status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total liabilities / 
Total assets
Z-score
Secured debt / 
Unsecured debt
Current assets / 
Current liabilities
Before After Before After Before After Before After
DOF 79.6% 67% 0.66 0.52 3.17 10.86 0.78 1.20
EIOF 71.3% 61% 0.36 0.61 6.93 23.81 1.80 3.97
EMGS 39.8% 53% 1.28 -4.54 0.00 0.00 0.79 1.91
EMGS2 49.4% 82% -4.07 -3.84 0.00 0.00 1.83 1.41
EMGS3 69.7% 80% -3.69 -7.21 0.00 0.00 0.43 1.61
FAR 92.2% -1.48 4.21 0.16
HAVI 91% 88% -1.26 -0.04 3.49 4.64 0.10 0.15
OTS 91% 30% -0.59 0.74 0.46 5.62 0.37 0.35
PLCS 81.6% 56% -2.32 -1.85 0.90 2.88 0.23 1.59
PLCS2 61.4% 73% -1.85 -1.42 2.28 2.28 1.39 1.37
PLCS3 86.6% 80% -1.42 -1.38 3.28 4.01 0.20 1.28
REM 80.3% 0.79 3.26 0.18
SBX 172.6% 68% -4.27 -1.91 1.15 0.71 0.26 0.68
SBX2 69.5% 62% -3.05 -10.52 1.45 0.21 0.36 0.62
SBX3 26.8% 33% -10.52 -4.96 0.33 0.33 0.67 2.61
SIOFF 61.7% 65% 0.61 0.09 2.39 3.75 1.00 1.54
SIOFF2 69.6% 73% 0.17 -0.03 3.05 2.99 0.81 0.97
SOFF 72.9% 71% 0.20 0.27 4.22 3.75 1.01 2.21
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Appendix C – Summary of each sample restructuring 
In this appendix, we provide a one-page summary of each of the 18 individual restructurings 
in our sample. The summary includes an overview of the implemented measures, as well as 
an illustration of the restructuring effect on the capital structure, current ratio and debt-to-
equity ratio.   
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DOF ASA 
 
Industry:    Supply  
Restructuring initiated:  09.02.2016  
Restructuring completed:  04.08.2016  
Implemented measures:  
 Haircut unsecured debt (50%) 
 Conversion unsecured debt (40%) 
 New equity offering (126 mUSD) 
 
 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mNOK) 
 
 
           Restructuring effect on current ratio                Restructuring effect on debt-to-equity ratio 
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Eidesvik Offshore  
 
Industry:    Supply  
Restructuring initiated:  28.02.2017 
Restructuring completed:  31.01.2018  
Implemented measures:  
 Amend and extend secured debt 
(36 months) 
 Haircut unsecured debt (40%) 
 Cash redemption (60%) 
 New equity offering (19 mUSD) 
 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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Electromagnetic Geoservices (1) 
 
Industry:    Seismic 
Restructuring initiated:  15.07.2015 
Restructuring completed:  22.12.2015 
Implemented measures:  
 Amend and extend unsecured debt 
(36 months) 
 Haircut unsecured debt (5%) 
 Cash redemption (18%) 
 New equity offering (33 mUSD) 
 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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Electromagnetic Geoservices (2)   
 
Industry:    Seismic 
Restructuring initiated:  09.02.2017 
Restructuring completed:  07.07.2017  
Implemented measures:  
 Haircut unsecured debt (3%) 
 Cash redemption (6%) 
 New equity offering (23 mUSD) 
 
 
 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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Electromagnetic Geoservices (3)  
 
Industry:    Seismic 
Restructuring initiated:  08.02.2018 
Restructuring completed:  16.05.2018  
Implemented measures:  
 New equity offering (11 mUSD) 
 
 
 
 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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Farstad Shipping 
 
Industry:    Offshore 
Restructuring initiated:  01.03.2016  
Restructuring completed:  10.03.2017  
Implemented measures:  
 Amend and extend secured debt 
(60 months)  
 Haircut secured debt (7%) 
 Haircut unsecured debt (72%) 
 Conversion secured debt (5%) 
 Conversion unsecured debt (28%) 
 New equity offering (63.2 mUSD) 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
 
 
           Restructuring effect on current ratio                Restructuring effect on debt-to-equity ratio 
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Havila Shipping 
 
Industry:    Offshore 
Restructuring initiated:  05.01.2016 
Restructuring completed:  01.03.2017  
Implemented measures:  
 Amend and extend secured debt 
(48 months) 
 Haircut unsecured debt (85%) 
 Conversion secured debt (11%) 
 Cash redemption unsecured debt 
(15%) 
 New equity offering (24.4 mUSD) 
 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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Oceanteam   
 
Industry:    Offshore 
Restructuring initiated:  20.03.2018 
Restructuring completed:  07.12.2018  
Implemented measures:  
 Conversion unsecured debt 
(100%) 
 Conversion shareholder loan 
(100%) 
 
 
 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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Polarcus (1) 
 
Industry:    Seismic 
Restructuring initiated:  07.12.2015 
Restructuring completed:  10.05.2016  
Implemented measures:  
 Amend and extend secured debt 
(60 months) 
 Haircut secured debt (14%) 
 Haircut unsecured debt (45%) 
 Conversion secured debt (6%) 
 Conversion unsecured debt (32%) 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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Polarcus (2) 
 
Industry:    Seismic 
Restructuring initiated:  09.02.2017 
Restructuring completed:  10.04.2017  
Implemented measures:  
 Amend and extend secured debt 
(12 months) 
 New equity offering (40 mUSD) 
 
 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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Polarcus (3) 
 
Industry:    Seismic 
Restructuring initiated:  27.10.2017 
Restructuring completed:  28.02.2018  
Implemented measures:  
 Amend and extend unsecured debt 
(36 months) 
 Haircut unsecured debt (73%) 
 Conversion unsecured debt (15%) 
 New equity offering (58 mUSD) 
 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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Rem Offshore 
 
Industry:    Offshore 
Restructuring initiated:  18.05.2016 
Restructuring completed:  12.12.2016
   
Implemented measures:  
 Amend and extend unsecured 
debt (42 months) 
 Haircut unsecured debt (50%) 
 Conversion unsecured debt (15%) 
 Cash redemption unsecured debt 
(8%) 
 New equity offering (18 mUSD) 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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Seabird Exploration (1) 
 
Industry:    Seismic 
Restructuring initiated:  15.08.2014 
Restructuring completed:  06.05.2015  
Implemented measures:  
 Amend and extend secured debt 
(24 months)  
 Haircut secured debt (53%) 
 Conversion secured debt (27%) 
 New equity offering (12 mUSD) 
 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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Seabird Exploration (2) 
 
Industry:    Seismic 
Restructuring initiated:  05.05.2017 
Restructuring completed:  27.12.2017  
Implemented measures:  
 Amend and extend unsecured 
debt (36 months)  
 Conversion secured debt (82%) 
 New equity offering (13.2 mUSD) 
 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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Seabird Exploration (3) 
 
Industry:    Seismic 
Restructuring initiated:  24.05.2018 
Restructuring completed:  10.08.2018  
Implemented measures:  
 New equity offering (39 mUSD) 
 
 
 
 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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Siem Offshore (1) 
 
Industry:    Offshore 
Restructuring initiated:  20.05.2015 
Restructuring completed:  18.09.2015  
Implemented measures:  
 Amend and extend secured debt 
(36 months) 
 New equity offering (100 mUSD) 
 
 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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Siem Offshore (2) 
 
Industry:    Offshore 
Restructuring initiated:  28.03.2017 
Restructuring completed:  23.06.2017  
Implemented measures:  
 Amend and extend secured debt 
(36 months) 
 Amend and extend unsecured 
debt (66 months) 
 Haircut unsecured debt (20%) 
 New equity offering (22 mUSD) 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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Solstad Offshore 
 
Industry:    Offshore 
Restructuring initiated:  24.05.2018 
Restructuring completed:  10.08.2018  
Implemented measures:  
 Amend and extend secured debt 
(24 months) 
 New equity offering (39 mUSD) 
 
 
 
 
Restructuring effect on capital structure (mUSD) 
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